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Abstract  
The current crisis in Syria has left the international community divided on 
solutions regarding the ongoing civil war that has escalated far beyond protests 
calling for the removal of the al-Assad regime. The events unfolding in Syria have 
divided the international community into groups that staunchly oppose the al-Assad 
regime, such as the United States, the European Union, and other countries in the 
region, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and those that oppose any pressure 
to the regime, such as Russia, China, and Iran. The primary purpose of this thesis is to 
determine why Russia would support such an unpopular, internationally isolated 
regime amidst the current instability in the Middle East. Secondly, this thesis will 
examine the internal factors that influence Russian foreign policy towards Syria, 
displaying that Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime goes far beyond Russian 
interests in Syria and Russian-Syrian relations. This research displays how Russia’s 
decision to back the Syrian regime has affected its international status in an attempt to 
demonstrate Russia’s largest foreign policy goal: great power status.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1   Introduction 
The uprising in Syria in March 2011, which has culminated into the Syrian 
Civil War was a result of protests organized with the intention of facilitating change 
to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Various factors, such as the unsuccessful 
attempt to instigate regime change by the opposition forces, a United Nations 
reported death toll of over 200,000 people killed, an estimated 3.7 million Syrian 
refugees, the use of chemical weapons, and the threat posed by ISIS in the region, has 
brought the Syrian Civil War to the international communities attention. The events 
unfolding in Syria have divided the international community into groups that 
staunchly oppose the al-Assad regime, such as the United States, the European Union, 
and other countries in the region, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and those 
that oppose any pressure to the regime, such as Russia, China, and Iran. This divide 
amongst the international community has prolonged any attempt at resolving the 
crisis and has tested the efficiency, credibility, and strength of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). 
Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, opposition forces throughout 
Syria have been deeply divided in their fight against the al-Assad regime, worrying 
the international community of the increased sectarian warfare spreading beyond 
Syria’s borders. At the beginning of the conflict, initial minor protests against the al-
Assad regime were instigated by Syrian civilians calling for reforms against the
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harsh regime and its security forces. Now, in 2015, Syria’s opposition forces have 
fallen wayside as the international community tackles the danger posed by ISIS, 
which has declared its goals the establishment of a hardline Sunni Islamic State, a 
caliphate in Iraq, and the removal of the al-Assad regime in Syria. The formation of 
ISIS has diverted international attention away from the core dispute in the Syrian 
Civil War and the future status of the al-Assad regime, while evolving into a war 
against terrorism that has further destabilized the region.  
The conflict in Syria has put pressure on the international community, most 
importantly the United States and the UNSC, to present a decisive plan on handling 
the current situation. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a legally binding 
international law prohibiting mass atrocities against civilians within a state, is a fairly 
new concept adopted by the Security Council in 2006. Two of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, Russia and China, have utilized their veto power to 
continuously halt any development towards any UN policy implementation 
concerning intervening in or resolving the Syrian Civil War. Syria is becoming 
increasingly more isolated from the international community and the future status of 
the regime is uncertain. “A growing consensus of leaders around the world believe 
the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is inevitable”, making the question of his 
fall a matter of ‘when’, “yet Russia continues to support the Assad regime and reject 
international calls to curb its actions”. 1 While politicians and scholars alike may 
speculate on the demise of the al-Assad regime, four years after the initial uprising in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Nicholas	  Kosturos,	  What	  Drives	  Russia’s	  Unrelenting	  Position	  on	  Syria?	  Center	  for	  American	  Progress.	  2012.	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March 2011, the Syrian Civil War has continued to devastate Syria and raise concern 
regarding the implementation of norms, such as R2P.  
As the conflict between the al-Assad regime and the Syrian opposition forces 
continues and the international community is stuck in a stalemate regarding 
intervention, it is apparent that there are no simple solutions on how to handle the 
civil war. International and domestic attempts for resolving the conflict have been 
dismissed, due to the opposition’s requirement of the removal of Syrian president 
Bashar al-Assad. Claims for intervention, whether military or humanitarian, have 
been promoted through various justifications, such as a response to the use of 
chemical weapons and the current rise of radical terrorist groups in the region, 
attempting to justify the legality for the use of force. During the beginning stages of 
the conflict, unofficial military intervention, to both the al-Assad regime and the 
Syrian opposition, had been taking place from various countries. “Russia and Iran 
continue supplying the Assad regime with arms and military advice”, while “at the 
other end of the spectrum, Turkey and several Arab states have been helping rebel 
groups secure arms and funds since the start of the conflict”.2 Since August 2014, a 
US-led coalition of countries from the Middle East and Europe have contributed 
military forces and support to moderate Syrian opposition forces and other forces in 
the region, along with airstrikes against ISIS. For the Syrian regime, the threat posed 
by ISIS may have temporarily diverted attention away from itself and towards the 
growing threat in the region, but Syrian opposition forces, U.S. President Barack 
Obama, and many countries in the Middle East, such as Turkey, continue to demand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Amir	  Taheri,	  	  "Has	  the	  Time	  Come	  for	  Military	  Intervention	  in	  Syria?"	  American	  
Foreign	  Policy	  Interests	  35.4	  (2013):	  217-­‐20.	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that the Syrian regime be removed. Most recently, the U.S. and Turkey signed an 
agreement to provide ground forces to the moderate Syrian opposition in order to 
fight both the threat posed by ISIS and to strengthen the Syrian opposition in their 
fight against the al-Assad regime. These agreements, along with other international 
pressure, demonstrate that calls for the removal of the al-Assad regime are still a 
significant goal for Syrian opposition forces and many nations alike.  
 
1.2   Research Question 
Amongst Syria’s allies, Russia has stepped up as the foremost defender of the 
al-Assad regime.  Russia provides the Syrian regime with political, economic, and 
military support, which has been utilized to defend the regime against pressure from 
the many Western and Arab countries calling for the removal of Assad. For example, 
in February of 2012, the UN Security Council failed to adopt a draft resolution that 
was aimed at stopping the continued violence in Syria, while demanding that the 
Syrian government cease crimes against its population. Out of the 15 countries that 
voted on this draft resolution, 13 members voted in favor of the resolution, while 
Russia and China vetoed the draft in support of the al-Assad regime. British foreign 
secretary William Hague responded to the vetoed draft by stating, “the time is long 
past for the international community, particularly those that have so far sheltered the 
Assad regime, to intensify the pressure to end over 10 months of violence”.3 The 
almost unanimous decision to accept the draft resolution demands the following 
questions: why does Russia support and continue to support the al-Assad regime 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Paul	  Harris,	  “Syria	  Resolution	  Vetoed	  by	  Russia	  and	  China	  at	  United	  Nations.”	  The	  
Guardian.	  4	  Feb.	  2012.	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despite international pressure? Why has Russia continued to support the al-Assad 
regime during the Syrian Civil War at the expense of its relations with the West, other 
Arab countries, and the potential future leaders of Syria? While there is obvious 
speculation on the issue of Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime, research into this 
complex issue displays that scholars have only begun to analyze this relationship; 
therefore, scholarly books, journals, and articles are limited in scope. Scholars have 
only presented the issue of Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria as a partial picture 
that lacks the broader analysis of the complex issue, focusing on bilateral economic 
relations or various regional factors that limit fully understanding Russian foreign 
policy towards the Syrian regime. This thesis will provide a more in-depth analysis 
and analyze the main explanatory factors of Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria, 
attempting to address the rather complex motives behind Russia’s support for the al-
Assad regime. 
The main research question this thesis will answer is: why does Russia 
support the al-Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War? This thesis will also focus 
on addressing the following research sub-questions: 
 
1) How are various domestic factors linked to Russian foreign policy 
implementation towards Syria?  
2) How is Russia’s foreign policy decision towards Syria affecting its 
relationship with the West? 
3) How is Russia’s foreign policy decision towards Syria affecting its 
relationship with countries in the Middle East?  
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The first sub-question will help address and explain why various internal factors, 
regarding Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Syria, are crucial to better understanding 
the evolution and rationale of Russian foreign policy. By analyzing Russia’s 
relationships with the West and various countries in the Middle East, the sub-
questions will further display how Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime has 
helped Russia enhance it’s great power status on the systemic level. By addressing 
these questions, this thesis will display how Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime 
is based on its attempt at great power status. 
 
1.3   Hypothesis  
Amongst international pressure to resolve the issue of civil war in Syria, 
Russia has continued to support a regime that may potentially fall. There are many 
explanations highlighted by scholars that fall short of comprehensively analyzing 
Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria, such as Russia’s military facilities in Tartus, 
military and trade sales, and the fact that Syria is among the few allies Russia has in 
the Middle East. These are micro level explanations focused on interests, where the 
gains made by Russia at all these levels do not outweigh the cost of supporting a 
regime in Syria that has been isolated internationally and may not survive. At the 
systemic level, Russian support for the al-Assad regime is centered on Russia’s 
perception of the international system and its role in it. Russian foreign policy and its 
leaders view the world in a multipolar framework attempting to bolster Russia’s 
status internationally, while balancing U.S./Western hegemony. Russia’s strategy 
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towards Syria has affected its relationships with the United States and other countries 
in the Middle East and, ultimately, Russia’s decision to support Syria will play a 
major role in how both Russia and the international community perceive its status of 
power. This thesis will analyze how Russia’s decision to back the al-Assad regime in 
Syria has demonstrated Russia’s desire for great power status, focusing on how 
Russia has utilized this relationship to strengthen and project Russian global, 
regional, and domestic power and influence. At the state level, Russian support for 
the al-Assad regime is centered on select factors that challenge and advance Russia’s 
great power self-perception and status among the international system. Major 
domestic factors, such as regime type, the role of media, internal conflicts, and 
Russia’s energy sector, contribute to the rationale behind Russia’s foreign policy 
strategy towards Syria. This thesis will look further into Russian foreign policy-
making and will analyze how Russia’s policy towards the al-Assad regime has been 
influenced by specific internal factors.  
Central to this hypothesis is the concept of sovereignty challenged by the 
concept of humanitarian intervention, which Russia believes “could be abused by 
powerful states as justifications for interventions that serve their political purpose”.4 
The logic of state sovereignty does not recognize intervention for humanitarian 
purposes; rather it assumes hegemonic motives behind states' actions, specifically the 
United States.  For Russia, any attempt at intervening in the Syrian Civil War outside 
of the approval of the UN Security Council, would be in direct violation of Syria’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Paul	  R.	  Williams,	  J.	  Trevor	  Ulbrick,	  and	  Jonathan	  Worboys.	  “Preventing	  Mass	  Atrocity	  Crimes:	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  and	  the	  Syria	  Crisis.”	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	  Journal	  
of	  International	  Law	  45	  (2012):	  473-­‐503.	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sovereignty; therefore, Russia has and continues to defend the Syrian regime despite 
internal pressure for al-Assad’s removal in a greater attempt to defend state 
sovereignty and prevent regime change on behalf of Western interests in the region.  
 
1.4   Methods and Chapter Outline  
 This thesis will utilize qualitative research methods based on secondary 
research for collecting data, examining both primary and secondary sources to help 
answer the research questions and sub-questions in this thesis. Sources, via print or 
the Internet, will consist of the following: books, journal articles and conference 
papers, newspapers, and research reports from NGOs and think-tanks. More 
importantly, official Russian statements, transcripts, and other official documents will 
be accessed from various official Russian government sources and archives in order 
to fully grasp the discourse provided by the Russian government regarding their 
decisions, interests, and foreign policy. The research conducted for this thesis will 
incorporate historical research in order to understand the past relations that have 
impacted the present foreign policy of the Russian government.  
 This thesis will be divided into four chapters. Following the Introduction, 
Chapter 2 will examine the current scholarly contributions regarding Russian foreign 
policy, Russian-Syrian relations, and claims for intervention into the Syrian Civil 
War. The literature survey of these topics will provide the reader with the analysis of 
scholars in the IR and political science fields in an attempt to provide a brief 
explanation of the literature that exists regarding these topics. This chapter will also 
examine the theories this thesis will utilize to analyze and answer questions regarding 
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Russian support for the al-Assad regime. Chapter 3 will examine Russian foreign 
policy-making from its international, regional, and domestic goals to its overall 
agenda, while examining how identity has factored into to Russian foreign policy-
making and its goal at establishing Russia as a greater power. The second portion of 
Chapter 3 will evaluate Russian foreign policy and its relations with the West, Syria, 
and other countries in the Middle East, focusing on how Russia’s decision to defend 
the Syrian regime has affected those relationships. Chapter 4 examines the internal 
factors that have influenced Russian foreign policy towards the Syrian regime, 
focusing on four key factors that have had direct influence on Russian policy towards 
Syria. Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude the thesis by providing a summary of the 
analysis regarding Russian support for the al-Assad regime, examining the 
conclusions made during the research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 This chapter will begin by outlining the current literature regarding key topics 
surrounding important issues in the paper. The second section of this chapter will 
present this thesis’ main theoretical framework, which will be applied to this thesis in 
an attempt to answer questions regarding Russian foreign policy towards Syria.  
 
2.1   Literature Review   
 In order to provide answers to the research question(s) presented in this thesis, 
a wide range of literature was examined in order to determine how scholars have 
analyzed the following topics: Russian foreign policy, Russian foreign policy towards 
Syria, and claims for intervention in Syria. In the following three sub-sections, a brief 
overview of the following topics will highlight the research that exists regarding the 
topics, focusing on trends and major viewpoints of scholars in the field of 
international politics and political science.  
 
Russian Foreign Policy 
It is undeniable that the literature that exists regarding Russian foreign policy 
is extensive, far beyond the capabilities of a simple introduction to the current 
research that exists. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the approach to studying 
Russian foreign policy was dominated by scholarly efforts, such as Adam Ulam’s 
Expansion and Coexistence (1968), leaving scholars to focus on ideological factors 
that influenced Russia’s expansionist foreign policy. Since then, scholars have 
questioned Russian foreign policy-making, applying an array of theories and 
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explanations as an attempt to analyze and explain Russia’s foreign policy. Since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has survived a global transformation, 
but has remained fairly consistent with its history of a rather centralized decision-
making process in foreign policy.  “Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Russian foreign policy has been heavily influenced by a perceived loss of great power 
status and a drive to restore Russia’s rightful place in world politics”.5 While the 
power behind Russian foreign policy may have weakened since the days of the Cold 
War, Russia continues to yield its influence through various factors, such as its seat as 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council, its nuclear status, and its dominant 
role as a regional power. 
Scholars have varied in their findings regarding Russian behavior towards the 
West with arguments varying from cooperative to confrontational. Tsygankov argues 
that the world we live in today is still dominated by Western power, although waning, 
leaving Russian foreign policy open to cooperation with both Western and non-
Western partners. For Russia, some of its most important networks for diplomatic or 
economic cooperation consist of collaboration with countries such as China and Iran, 
which has been utilized to increase Russian influence and power while establishing a 
favorable geopolitical environment for the Russian Federation. Russia’s current 
foreign policy is motivated by the increase in Russian global, regional, and domestic 
power, with Russian leaders concerned more with policies that benefit Russian 
interests. Tsygankov argues, “what often determines Moscow’s foreign policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Paul	  D'Anieri,	  	  "Russian	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Continuity,	  Revolution,	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  Status."	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective:	  Domestic	  and	  International	  Influences	  
on	  State	  Behavior.	  By	  Ryan	  K.	  Beasley.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  CQ,	  2002.	  95-­‐118.	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choices is whether or not the West’s international actions are perceived by Russian 
officials as accepting Russia as an equal and legitimate member of the world”.6  
Russia has recently experienced a period free from external foreign threats but 
has faced a wide array of internal and regional challenges that have left Russian 
leaders extremely insecure regarding their countries future. After the increase of 
terrorist activities in the Caucasus and the attacks on the U.S in September 2001, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin took advantage of the ‘war on terror’ to reinforce 
Russia’s domestic and international position in order to justify his formation and 
reaction to security threats. Lo states, “it was similarly predictable that international 
terrorism should emerge at the top of the agenda; its inclusion in this way tapped into 
the mood of the political elite and the public at large, and served to ‘legitimize’ the 
Putin administration’s conduct of the Chechen war at home and abroad”.7 Russia 
aligned itself with the Western struggle against terrorism in the Middle East in an 
attempt to strengthen Russia’s international status while protecting Russian interests 
and preserve regional stability.   
 Currently, Russia has found itself involved as a major participant in two 
extremely important international crises that may potentially alter its status among the 
international community: the spread of ISIS’s growing influence in the region and the 
Russian annexation of the Crimea. The current spread of radical terrorist groups in 
Syria and Iraq has resulted in military action from the international community, with 
a US-led coalition against ISIS. The Russian government has stated any action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Andrei	  P.	  Tsygankov,	  Russia's	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Change	  and	  Continuity	  in	  National	  
Identity.	  Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2010.	  7	  Bobo	  Lo,	  Russian	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Era:	  Reality,	  Illusion,	  and	  
Mythmaking.	  Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  Hampshire:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2002:	  71.	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without UN authorization “would be an act of aggression, a gross violation of 
international law”.8  Russia has condemned any unauthorized external action in Syria 
increasing the chance for confrontation between Russia and the West. Along with the 
current situation in Syria, Russia has received international attention and pressure, 
such as economic sanctions from the US and many European countries, for its 
involvement in the deployment of Russian troops and the annexation of Ukraine’s 
Crimea region. Nichols argues that “the seizure and annexation of Crimea appeared to 
surprise some policy makers by its speed and brazenness” and that the events that 
have unfolded “could be one stage in a multi-stage effort that could involve an effort 
to seize more control over eastern and southern Ukraine”.9  
 
Russian Foreign Policy Towards Syria 
 Foreign relations between Russia and Syria date back to the Soviet Union, 
when “Syria became the largest noncommunist buyer of Soviet weapons, and the 
Syrian leaders considered Moscow to be their “only dependable global ally” who did 
not force them to compromise their own vital interests.”10 In 2014, Syria finds itself 
isolated from the international community with a reliable ally in Putin who continues 
to supply the Syrian government with arms and continues to use Russia’s power in 
the UN Security Council to block any resolutions against the al-Assad regime. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Alexei	  Anishchuk,	  	  "Russia	  Says	  Air	  Strikes	  in	  Syria	  Would	  Be	  Act	  of	  Aggression	  without	  U.N.	  Vote."	  Reuters.	  Thomson	  Reuters,	  11	  Sept.	  2014.	  <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/11/us-­‐syria-­‐crisis-­‐russia-­‐airstrikes-­‐idUSKBN0H61KV20140911>.	  9	  United	  States.	  Cong.	  Russian	  Political,	  Economic,	  and	  Security	  Issues	  and	  U.S.	  Interests.	  By	  Jim	  Nichol.	  Cong.	  Rept.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  2014.	  10	  Andrej	  Kreutz,	  	  Russia	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Friend	  or	  Foe?	  Westport,	  CT:	  Praeger	  Security	  International,	  2007.	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Commetteri argues that Russian support for the Syrian regime and its opposition with 
the other permanent members of the UNSC on Syria “can largely be seen as related to 
Resolution 1973” in Libya.11 Allison argues that Moscow’s attempt to block sanctions 
against al-Assad and its support for the regime are based on “a narrative centered on 
the principle of territorial sovereignty, which regrets the notion that states can be held 
subject to standards of political legitimacy devised in western capitals”.12 Russia’s 
policy towards Syria, and many other non-democratic regimes for that matter, has 
been to negotiate with the sitting government and not the opposition, which has been 
supported by “a number of governments and non-state actors that are opposed to U.S. 
policies or are simply wedded to the traditional values of international relations, such 
as state sovereignty and nonintervention”.13 
Scholars, such as Troyanksy (2013), Khlebnikov (2011), and Gaub and 
Popsecu (2013) attribute Russian foreign policy towards Syria to economic and 
material interests, such as Russian arms exports. While economic interests exist for 
Russian support in Syria, “Moscow’s financial deals with a number of nations in the 
Greater Middle East- particularly Turkey and Israel- by far exceed Russia’s trade with 
Syria”.14 It is undeniable that there are various Russian interests satisfied by the 
current relationship with the Syrian government, but Russian foreign policy towards 
Syria cannot be understood through explanations based on ‘interest’ alone. This thesis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Camilla	  Committeri,	  "When	  Domestic	  Factors	  Prevail	  Upon	  Foreign	  Ambitions:	  Russia's	  Strategic	  Game	  in	  Syria."	  IAI	  Working	  Papers	  12.26,	  (2012):	  5-­‐6.	  12	  Roy	  Allison,	  Russia	  and	  Syria:	  Explaining	  Alignment	  with	  a	  Regime	  in	  Crisis.	  Malden,	  MA:	  International	  Affairs	  89:4	  (2013):	  795-­‐823.	  	  13	  Dmitri	  Trenin,	  The	  Mythical	  Alliance:	  Russia’s	  Syria	  Policy.	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  (2013):	  3-­‐4.	  	  14	  Andrej	  Kreutz,	  Syria:	  Russia’s	  Best	  Asset	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Russie.Nei.Visions	  no.	  55,	  Institut	  français	  des	  relations	  internationales,	  Paris,	  Nov.	  2010,	  pg.	  9	  http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-­‐detail&id=6301&id_provenance=97.	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will attempt to analyze modern Russian-Syrian relations in-depth in Chapter 3. 
Bagdonas argues that “the realization of Russia’s material interests in the Middle East 
largely depends on the global and regional power balance, profit as a motive in 
foreign policy-decision making is secondary to power and prestige, at least in this 
particular case”.15 Russian foreign policy towards Syria is based on a deep-rooted, 
mutually beneficial relationship that is providing both regimes with tools to achieve 
their goals.  
 
Claims for Intervention in Syria  
 “Syria can still be saved from the worst calamity- if the international 
community can show the courage and leadership necessary to compromise on their 
partial interests for the sake of the Syrian people”.16 This quote came after Kofi 
Annan, former United Nations Secretary-General, resigned from the position of 
Special Envoy to Syria in early August 2012. Much debate exists throughout the 
international system regarding the decision to intervene in the Syrian Civil War, but 
after four years of conflict, the international community continues to be divided and a 
diplomatic solution is even further from fruition. Claims for humanitarian 
intervention have emerged from the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
which “is a complicated and ‘emerging norm’ of international law that seeks to 
provide a means for the international community to prevent mass atrocity crimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Azuolas	  Bagdonas,	  "Russia's	  Interests	  in	  the	  Syrian	  Conflict:	  Power,	  Prestige,	  and	  Profit."	  European	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Science	  5.2	  (2012):	  55-­‐77.	  16	  Kofi	  Annan,	  “Press	  Conference	  by	  Kofi	  Annan,	  Joint	  Special	  Envoy	  for	  Syria”.	  The	  United	  Nations	  in	  the	  Heart	  of	  Europe.	  Geneva,	  2	  August	  2012.	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occurring within the boundaries of a sovereign state”.17 Under Article 24 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC has the “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security”; therefore, the Security Council is 
the ultimate authority on decision-making regarding the use of armed force to 
preserve or reestablish international peace and security.18 Stahn argues that the case 
for intervention in Syria “was not directly aimed at ending atrocities and armed 
conflict as such, but guided by other purposes”, which have been to shift power from 
Assad and to reprimand the unlawful use of chemical weapons.19 “ 
 Since the beginning of the crisis, those in favor of intervention have focused 
on the number of deaths, internally displaced persons, and refugees that have 
accumulated during the Syrian Civil War, but claims for intervening were reignited 
after a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta.20 Blockman 
argues that the “specific offence that pushed the Obama administration across its self-
imposed red line is not the humanitarian disaster”, but “the apparent use, on August 
21st, of chemical weapons, which allegedly killed more than 1,400 people”.21 As the 
international community speculated upon whom to blame, the governments of the 
United States and Great Britain contemplated the legality of military force under a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Paul	  R.	  Williams,	  J.	  Trevor	  Ulbrick,	  and	  Jonathan	  Worboys.	  “Preventing	  Mass	  Atrocity	  Crimes:	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  and	  the	  Syria	  Crisis.”	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	  Journal	  
of	  International	  Law	  45	  (2012):	  473-­‐503.	  18	  United	  Nations,	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  24	  October	  1945,	  1	  UNTS	  XVI,	  available	  at:	  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html	  [accessed	  12	  March	  2014].	  19	  Carsten	  Stahn,	  “Between	  Law-­‐breaking	  and	  Law-­‐making:	  Syria,	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  and	  ‘What	  the	  Law	  Ought	  to	  Be’.”	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Security	  Law.	  (2013):	  970.	  	  20	  Kenneth	  Anderson,	  "Legality	  of	  Intervention	  in	  Syria	  in	  Response	  to	  Chemical	  Weapons	  Attacks."	  American	  Society	  of	  International	  Law	  17.21	  (2013).	  21	  Steven	  Blockmans,	  "Syria	  and	  the	  Red	  Lines	  of	  International	  Law."	  Center	  for	  
European	  Policy	  Studies	  (2013).	  Web.	  <http://www.ceps.eu/book/syria-­‐and-­‐red-­‐lines-­‐international-­‐law>.	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rationale of preventative diplomacy.22 Ultimately, Stahn (2013), Taheri (2013), and 
Francioni and Bakker (2013) have dissected the concept of the R2P doctrine and the 
legality of humanitarian intervention in Syria and argue that intervention in Syria 
without UNSC authorization is not credible and would be dangerous.23  
 
Currently, the literature that exists regarding Russia’s foreign policy towards 
Syria provides a limited explanation for Russian support of the al-Assad regime. 
Previous research has employed generalized attempts at analyzing this extremely 
complex topic, resulting in brief contributions to the field of international relations. 
Research into the topic of contemporary Russian-Syrian relations reveals an absence 
of scholarly works that extends beyond journal articles with limited explanations. By 
adopting a structured and focused examination of Russia’s foreign policy and its 
support for the Syrian regime, this thesis will attempt to provide a more in-depth, 
inclusive contribution to the existing literature. This thesis intends to advance the 
literature targeted at understanding Russian foreign policy behavior towards the al-
Assad regime by examining Russia’s foreign policy through a multifaceted theoretical 
lens, focusing on internal and external factors.  
 
2.2   Theoretical Framework 
Analyzing Russian foreign policy and Russia’s decision to support the al-
Assad regime in Syria cannot be done without the proper theoretical discussion. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Carsten	  Stahn,	  “Between	  Law-­‐breaking	  and	  Law-­‐making:	  Syria,	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  and	  ‘What	  the	  Law	  Ought	  to	  Be’.”	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Security	  Law.	  (2013).	  23	  Ahmed	  Souaiaia,	  "The	  Dangers	  of	  Military	  Intervention	  in	  Syria	  Without	  UNSC	  Authorization."	  OpenDemocracy.	  <http://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmed-­‐e-­‐souaiaia/dangers-­‐of-­‐military-­‐intervention-­‐in-­‐syria-­‐without-­‐unsc-­‐authorization>.	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relationship between theory and policy is undeniably important with respect to the 
coordination of all state policy, including economic, political, and military tools, or a 
states’ ‘grand strategy’. Theory is utilized in a states’ strategy like a model, or cause-
and-effect hypotheses, that policymakers employ in an attempt to produce the most 
strategic outcomes.  
There is consensus among scholars that some countries have a larger influence 
on international politics than others, otherwise known as great powers. Waltz argues 
that great powers tend to behave differently than other states, because of their 
capabilities. Scholars have tried to place a set of criteria to the characteristics and 
capabilities of what they categorize as great powers. Waltz claims that great powers 
must excel in areas over other states in one or more of the following ways: size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence.24 Levy claims that great powers are distinguishable 
from other states by the following: 1) “a high level of military capability that makes 
them relatively self-sufficient strategically and capable of projecting power beyond 
their borders; 2) a broad concept of security that embraces a concern with regional 
and/or global power balances; and 3) a greater assertiveness than lesser powers in 
defining and defending their interest”.25 While scholars have presented a wide array 
of definitions for defining a ‘great power’, ultimately, attempts at great power 
measurement stem from two major factors, economic and political power.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Kenneth	  N	  Waltz,	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  McGraw-­‐Hill,	  1979:	  131.	  	  25	  Jack	  Levy,	  War	  and	  the	  Modern	  Great	  Power	  System.	  Lexington	  University,	  1983:	  11-­‐19.	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The concepts of great power and the rivalries that exist between those great 
powers originate in offensive realist theory. Classical realist theory is based on the 
belief that states, in an anarchic system, operate out of rational self-interest in 
competition for security and power. One of the most important differences between 
the various proponents of realism versus offensive realism is that realists view states 
in competition for security and power to assure survival, while offensive realists 
argue that states seek power with hegemony as their ultimate goal.26  Mearsheimer 
argues that calculations regarding a states’ power form the foundation for how a state 
views the international system and their position in it. Research on interstate rivalry 
demonstrates that scholars, such as Goertz and Diehl (1995), claim “that international 
shocks to the system in the form of world wars or territorial shifts” drastically affect 
rivalry dynamics.27 The authors argue that the strategic interests of great power 
rivalries are contingent on their ability to threaten and compete with other states. 
Ultimately, great power rivalry theory states that the distribution of power in the 
international system influences the number of great powers and their polarity, or how 
that power is distributed.  
Unfortunately, explanations for Russian foreign policy based on the theory of 
great power rivalry alone do not present the complete context. Under the framework 
of realism, power is the main influencing factor behind a countries foreign policy, 
leaving no room for the inclusion of cultural beliefs, such as identity, or indigenous 
views seen through the Russian perspective. As a result, realism can overlook or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  John	  J.	  Mearsheimer,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  Great	  Power	  Politics.	  New	  York:	  Norton,	  2001:	  22.	  	  27	  Michael	  P.	  Colaresi,	  Scare	  Tactics:	  The	  Politics	  of	  International	  Rivalry.	  Syracuse:	  Syracuse	  UP,	  2005:	  6.	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wrongfully interpret explanations or changes in Russian foreign policy, providing an 
incomprehensive explanatory framework. This thesis proposes a complimentary 
theory in order to ensure a more complete understanding of Russian foreign policy in 
Syria. This thesis will utilize constructivist theory, arguing that Russia’s great power 
status is that of a self-perceived status, examining how the identity of Russia as a 
great power has affected its foreign policy. Unlike realism, constructivism is a theory 
in international relations that questions the ‘national’ understanding of a state’s 
interest, focusing on identity and local factors that influence policy. For realism, 
foreign policy can be viewed as a product of a unitary state’s advancing power, while 
constructivism views the role of foreign policy as a means to put forth a particular 
national identity or image that will be recognized internally and by the ‘other’.28 For 
Russia, foreign policy is a tool utilized in the pursuit of increasing its great power 
status, which is an intrinsic part of the Russian national identity, or image, already. 
For Russia, notions of great power are entrenched from a historical legacy that has 
left Russia seeking international prestige. Arguments over identity and its link to 
Russian foreign policy as a means for establishing Russia as the great power are 
based in the theory of constructivism.  
It is important to note that thesis does not argue that realism is constructivism 
and constructivism is realism. When defining and examining theories in international 
relations it is obvious that these theories do not exist on a simple linear association 
with each other, but I argue that there is room for overlap between the two. This 
thesis recognizes that these theories are distinct but compatible. J. Samuel Barkin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Andrei	  P.	  Tsygankov,	  Russia's	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Change	  and	  Continuity	  in	  National	  
Identity.	  Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2010:	  14-­‐17.	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argues, “a realist constructivism is a constructivism in which a concern for power 
politics, understood as relational rather than structural, is central”. 29  
Identity has played a major role in questions regarding Russia’s status and 
what role Russia should be in the international system. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union was an extremely difficult challenge for Russia, signaling the shift from 
superpower to ‘second-tier’ status. In the post-Cold War international arena, 
questions are asked by scholars about whether Russia should attempt to reinvent itself 
as a regional power or continue to try to strengthen its great power status. “One 
significant idea that has resurfaced in contemporary Russian culture has been the 
traditional messianic view that Russia is a unique country which must pursue its own 
path of development that is necessarily different from that of the West, and will have 
a special, distinctive role to play in the future”.30  
Regardless of the sincerity or skepticism one assigns to notions of great power 
status, it is undeniable that the theme of great power status has been a major 
component of modern Russian foreign policy. This theme can be found in the Russian 
sense of greatness (derzhavnost), which some scholars have translated as “French 
estatism on steroids, almost the cult of the great state”.31 Derzhavnost is a Russian 
term that refers to the Great Power ideology behind the actions of the Russian state 
and identity of the Russian people. This idea of Russian great power status has 
resonated into the idea that Russia must think and act like a great power with the 
privilege of involvement in matters deemed important to national interest. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  J.	  Samuel	  Barkin,	  Realist	  Constructivism:	  Rethinking	  International	  Relations	  Theory.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  2010:	  169.	  	  30	  Rosalind	  Marsh,	  "The	  Nature	  of	  Russia's	  Identity:	  The	  Theme	  of	  “Russia	  and	  the	  West”	  in	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Culture."	  Nationalities	  Papers	  35.3	  (2007):	  562.	  	  31	  E.	  Wayne	  Merry,	  "Testimony:	  E.	  Wayne	  Merry."	  CSCE.	  (2007)	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indispensability and its influence on Russian foreign policy will be discussed further 
in Chapter 3.   
Realists have always regarded domestic politics and foreign policy as two 
distinct spheres of policy making, but history has shown that these spheres are not 
exclusive and have been more interconnected than previously thought. Contemporary 
international relations has recognized the increasingly vague distinction between 
domestic and international politics; therefore, it is important when analyzing foreign 
policy that international social conditions are not privileged over domestic conditions 
such as regime type, local economics, and other social interactions. International 
relations theory has traditionally developed research patterns that privilege either the 
system or county, but recently developed alternative constructivist theory, such as 
unit-level constructivism, has provided a evolved constructivist approach to include a 
states domestic political influences. Authors like James Rosenau argued that foreign 
policy shapes and determines domestic policy, while characteristics of domestic 
policy in turn produce foreign policy.32 Unit-level constructivist theory, represented in 
the works of scholars like Peter Katzenstien, emphasizes the focus on domestic 
factors in a states foreign policy, stressing “the relationship between domestic social 
legal norms and the identities and interests of states”.33 This thesis will utilize this 
theory to analyze Russia’s decision to support the al-Assad regime beyond 
international determinants, addressing the various domestic factors that have 
influenced Russian foreign policy in Syria. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, internal factors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  James	  N.	  Rosenau,	  Linkage	  Politics:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Convergence	  of	  National	  and	  
International	  Systems.	  The	  Free	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1969.	  33	  Christian	  Reus-­‐Smit,	  “Constructivism.”	  Theories	  of	  International	  Relations.	  3rd	  ed.	  Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  Hampshire:	  Palgrave	  Macmillian,	  (2005):	  199.	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such as regime type, energy and oil, internal conflict and the rise of radical Islam, and 
the role of the Russian media will be analyzed, focusing on the how these internal 
factors have influenced Russia’s policy to support the al-Assad regime.  
The research conducted in the proposed thesis will employ two levels of 
analysis, which will provide a better understanding into the foreign policy of Russia 
and their decision to support the al-Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War. These 
levels of analysis are: state and systemic. At the state level of analysis, this research 
will examine the various domestic factors that help shape Russian foreign policy 
towards Syria. When addressing the state level, this thesis will focus on two areas: 
government, such as regime type, and society, such as the role of the media in 
shaping public opinions. The systemic level analysis will focus on the interstate 
affairs that are implemented through bilateral or multilateral negotiations both 
regionally and/or globally. This type of analysis will provide answers regarding the 
formation and implementation of Russian foreign policy by addressing two questions: 
“do states act the way they act in the world because of who they are (as defined 
within the state)” or “do states act the way they do because of where they sit in the 
world (as defined by their relationships with other states in the international 
system)”?34 
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  Neack,	  The	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  Foreign	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Chapter 3: Russian Foreign Relations 
 
After the fall of the Soviet Empire and the turbulence of Yeltin’s presidency, 
Vladimir Putin emerged with a new foreign policy focused on reestablishing Russia 
as a ‘great power’ among the international system and asserting its dominance 
amongst the former Soviet Republics. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Russia was faced with the massive challenge of developing a national identity in an 
environment of frequent political and economic turmoil. Kortunov argues that Russia 
adjusted their foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union from an ideological 
policy to a more pragmatic policy that emphasizes the following: geopolitics, the 
protection of Russians outside of Russia, and the use of strong tactics in different 
spheres of influence.35 The goals of this new foreign policy were driven by an 
opposition to the West, specifically the United States, and to obtain a greater position 
for Russia on the international stage.  
When discussing Russia’s foreign policy, it is important to begin with a brief 
definition about what foreign policy represents, since this thesis is intended on 
providing an analysis of the formulation of Russian foreign policy-making towards 
the al-Assad regime in Syria. According to scholars, foreign policy is “the goals that 
officials representing states seek abroad, the values that underline those goals, and the 
means or instruments used to pursue them”.36 Putin has expanded the concept of 
Russian foreign policy to include an internal dimension, claiming that for Russia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Sergei	  Kortunov	  and	  Andrei	  Kortunov.	  “From	  “moralism”	  to	  “pragmatics”:	  New	  dimensions	  of	  Russian	  foreign	  policy”.	  Comparative	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  13:3,	  (1994):	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  Charles	  W.	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  and	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  R.	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  World	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  and	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  Belmont,	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“foreign policy is both an indicator and a determining factor for the condition of 
internal affairs”.37 He stressed that the “competence, skill, and effectiveness with 
which we use our diplomatic resources determines not only the prestige of our 
country in the eyes of the world but also the political and economic situation inside 
Russia itself”.38 This thesis will present Russia’s current foreign policy as that of a 
‘sovereign democracy’39 that limits the influence of international law, global 
economic and political bodies, and global public opinion on Russian domestic and 
foreign procedures. Russian sovereign democracy has two basic aspects: “the primacy 
of sovereignty over democracy and a sovereign Russian democratic institutional 
development which does not correspond to Western standards”.40 While the concept 
of sovereign democracy may have its flaws and divide many regarding its application, 
the concept helps explain the managed and centralized political structure of the 
Russian government, which utilizes government control to prevent challenges to the 
corrupt, elitist system.   
Prior to discussing Russia’s foreign policy, it is important to reference the 
main sources of influence that dominate Russia’s political and economic structure.  
Politically, Russia is dominated by an exclusive but internally competitive elite, lead 
by the president, who has complete constitutional authority over foreign policy. This 
constitutional power allows the president the authority to pass legislation without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Igor	  S.	  Ivanov,	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  New	  Russian	  Diplomacy.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Nixon	  Center,	  (2002):	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  38	  Ibid.	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consent from parliament, which has allowed Putin to return to a more authoritarian 
pattern of vertical power sharing politics. Economics are characterized by rent-
seeking behavior, where privileged individuals and companies “seek returns from 
state-sponsored monopoly rights”.41  The elites whose interests are tied to economic 
success currently dominate Russia’s foreign policy-making, establishing a system that 
secures their power and control. This combination of influence facilitated the merging 
of economic and state power on Putin’s terms, reversing privatized assets considered 
most important to the state. This can be seen in Russia’s most successful and 
important sector of its economy: the energy sector, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. “Russia’s state dominated energy sector is now seen by many in the 
Kremlin as a foundation of the country’s power and an engine of economic growth 
and modernization”.42  It is necessary to display how political and economic 
governance influence foreign policy in order to fully understand how informal and 
uninstitutionalized foreign policy making can be.  Scholars have emphasized 
“although a state’s external environment is important, we find that elite ideas could 
provide us with greater leverage in explaining change and continuity in foreign 
policy”.43 This domestic framework that produces and influences Russia’s foreign 
policy has been labeled Putinism, which has been defined as a leadership style or 
regime type under the authoritative policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
Putinsim in Russia has resulted in a single self-perpetuating regime since 1991, with 	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  (Texas	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elections that act as a legitimating mechanism. It is through this centralized process of 
control that Putin and a select elites are able to monopolize the economic and political 
system in their interest.  
This chapter will begin by analyzing the key determinants of Russian foreign 
policy, focusing on Russia’s current ambitions, goals, and challenges. By addressing 
these goals, a foundation will be established for further analyzing Russia’s foreign 
policy towards Syria. Russia’s foreign policy goals are crucial in comprehending its 
approach to the international system and how it views itself among that system. This 
chapter will analyze the issue of Russian identity and its role in the formation of 
Russia’s perceived ‘great power’ status. For Russia the issue of identity is key to 
understanding the source of Russia’s perceived great power status. Finally, this 
chapter will analyze Russia’s relations with the West, the Middle East, and Syria and 
will attempt to analyze how Russia’s decision to back the al-Assad regime has 
affected those relationships and Russia’s current status in the international system. By 
examining these relationships and how Russia’s decision to support the al-Assad 
regime in Syria has influenced these relationships. This thesis will demonstrate how 
Russia’s has utilized its position with Syria to maximize its power and influence in 
the Middle East and the international system. 
 
3.2   Foreign Policy 
Official Russian foreign policy is exhibited in the Foreign Policy Concept, a 
lasting strategic document approved by the president, which outlines Russia’s views 
on the current state of international affairs, its major priorities, its threats, and its main 
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objectives. The document consists of five main sections: general provisions, foreign 
policy of the Russian Federation and the modern world, priorities of the Russian 
Federation in addressing global problems, regional priorities, and development and 
implementation of Russian foreign policy.44 The current Foreign Policy Concept 
prioritizes issues such as building spheres of influence in the region and post-Soviet 
states, the importance of the role of the UN Security Council, strengthening Russia’s 
economic and trade status, and the declining power of the United States, among 
others. Ultimately, the main goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to ensure the protection 
of citizens’, society’s and the state’s interests.  
One of the key threats and priorities outlined in the concept is the issue of 
sovereignty and the use of force through interventions. The concept blatantly states 
that “it is unacceptable that military interventions…which undermine the foundations 
of international law based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, be carried 
out on the pretext of implementing the concept of "responsibility to protect" and that 
Russia strongly supports seeking “political and diplomatic solutions to regional 
conflicts through collective actions of the international community in strong belief 
that modern conflicts cannot be resolved through the use of force”.45 It is important to 
note that the 2013 concept was formulated during a time of Russian dissatisfaction 
with the 2008 invasion of Iraq, the 2011 invasion of Libya, and the current civil war 
in Syria. The document clearly states that a major threat to Russia is the use of 
unilateral sanctions and coercive methods outside of the UNSC structure. It is 	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obvious why Russia would defend the role of the UNSC, seeing how the forum is one 
of the only last resources left where Russia can be seen as an equal to the other 
parties, specifically the United States, and be seen as a major power. 
While the document outlines challenges to the current foreign policy of 
Russia, the document emphasizes the future role of Russia in international affairs, 
promoting Russia as a great power amongst a changing geopolitical landscape. The 
current Foreign Policy Concept “places greater emphasis on the world’s 
‘civilizational diversity’, competition over values and the negative impact of a ‘re-
ideologization’ of international affairs”.46 One of the most important aspects of the 
document is that it identifies the change in the international order, specifically the 
decrease of Western power, and emphasizes the increased role Russia will play in the 
future multipolar international system. Former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny 
Primakov formulated a foreign policy model structured around the idea of Russia 
heading a multipolar alliance of likeminded powers to contest what was viewed as the 
unipolar world being constructed by the United States. Prior documents argue for 
Russia to acquire a “standing position” amongst the international community, while 
the most current concept argues for a “strengthening position” that would help 
strengthen Russia’s status and power among in the international system.47 Strength is 
a characteristic often utilized in Putin’s current foreign policy, which can be 
displayed through relationships that are based on hard power coercion and stressed 
relations with the United States and Europe.  	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3.3   Russia’s Foreign Policy Goals 
 Below are the main goals outlined in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept signed by 
Putin. A deeper analysis of the goals reflects the strategic culture of the Russian 
Federation. The following goals demonstrate Russia’s current view of the 
international system and reflect changes in Russia’s foreign policy in an unstable 
strategic environment. The goals outlined in this document provide the foundation for 
how Russia approaches its international and regional priorities, threats, and 
opportunities; therefore, it is necessary to highlight Russia’s main foreign policy 
goals prior to discussing its policy towards Syria, the rest of the Middle East, and the 
West. While each of these stated goals apply to Russia’s entire foreign policy, these 
goals provide Russia with its official discourse to justify its actions in defending the 
al-Assad regime in Syria. Overall, these goal provide an insight into the building of 
Russian foreign policy making, helping one further understand Russia’s justifications 
for its decisions and actions.  
 
1) The first goal outlined in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept is to ensure 
“the security of the country, protecting and strengthening its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and securing its high standing in the international community as 
one of the influential and competitive poles of the modern world”.48 This first goal is 
geared toward the concept of a sovereign state, whose main goal is the protection of 
its people and to assure its own survival. This goal is focused on the internal and 
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external strengthening of Russia, hoping to secure its spot as a multiregional pole of 
power. One of Russia’s main ambitions its to increase its international posture in an 
attempt to further its status as a great power both internationally and regionally. 
Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower, its position in the UNSC, and its vast 
quantities of natural resources only strengthens Russia’s position in the international 
system. 
 
2) The second goal is related to Russia’s economy, focusing on the creation of 
“favorable external conditions for a steady and dynamic growth of the Russian 
economy” and “strengthening Russia's positions in the global trade and economic 
system”.49 This goal has been highlighted in the concept because the Kremlin 
recognizes that external activities influence the internal development of Russia’s 
economy. For Russia, the country with the largest natural gas reserves, the creation of 
favorable conditions and its success in the global economic system are fueled almost 
entirely through Russia’s energy sector. Russia has utilized its oil and natural gas to 
thwart domestic economic ruin and extend Russia’s economic influence 
internationally. Ultimately, this goal is extremely important for both Russian foreign 
and domestic policy because economic success would allow Russia to advance its 
status in the international system while pursuing its national interests.   
 
3) The third goal is the “active promoting of international peace and universal 
security and stability for the purpose of establishing a just and democratic system of 
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international relations based on collective decision-making in addressing global 
issues, on the primacy of international law, including, first of all, the UN Charter, as 
well as on equal, partnership relations among nations with the central coordinating 
role of the UN as the principal organization regulating international relations”.50 
Russia has expressed its opinion on the role of the UNSC as the main source for 
collective solutions to international crises, advocating for the legality of the UN 
Charter and its role in international law. Russia’s support for the role of the UN is due 
to its permanent seat in the UNSC and its right to veto, which it has utilized in 
defending the al-Assad regime against any form of international pressure on the 
regime. “It was therefore natural for Russia to insist on the UNSC’s continuing role in 
international dispute settlement, because this forum was one of the few where it could 
aspire to a rough equality with the United States as well as claim major power status 
by ‘right’ and precedent”.51 Russia has expressed its dissatisfaction with the U.S. 
policy of unilaterally handling issues outside the auspices of the UNSC, where Russia 
is able to weld its power as an equal.  
 
4) The fourth stated goal in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept is to promote 
“good-neighborly relations with adjoining states and helping to overcome existing 
and prevent potential tensions and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian 
Federation”.52 Since the disintegration from the Soviet Union and the current spread 
of radical Islam in its region, Russia has been very active and interested in the state of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50Ibid.	  51	  Bobo	  Lo,	  Russian	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Soviet	  Era:	  Reality,	  Illusion,	  and	  
Mythmaking.	  Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  Hampshire:	  Palgrave	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  (2002):	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affairs of it’s neighbors in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the 
Middle East. In the region, Russia has involved itself in many conflicts, like those in 
George and Ukraine, recognizing that Russia’s security and economic development 
depend on stability in the region. In the case of Syria, Russia has been extremely 
vocal of fears of the spread of radical Islam among the opposition groups opposing 
the al-Assad regime in the region, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.  For Russia, 
regional stability is key for maintaining its policies while attempting to strengthen its 
position and influence both regionally and beyond.  
 
5) The fifth goal is to develop “mutually beneficial and equal bilateral and 
multilateral partnership relations with foreign states, interstate associations, 
international organizations and forums on the basis of respect for independence and 
sovereignty, pragmatism, transparency, multi-vector approach, predictability and non-
confrontational protection of national interests”.53 Regionally, Russia has utilized its 
role as a major power through many such organizations as the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), the CIS, and the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsec), where in such organizations Russia has utilized its international status to 
take on more of a hegemonic role. Internationally, Russia has utilized organizations 
such as the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and until most recently the G8, which has 
suspended Russia’s membership indefinitely due to its actions in the Russian 
annexation of the Crimea, as tool to defend its interests and power status globally. 
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Russia has utilized these organizations to position itself “as the champion of 
multilateralism”, which has “offered it the opportunity to present itself as a leading 
light in an alternative consensus, one that challenged both the primacy of the United 
States and the moral universalism of Western values”. 54 
 
6) The sixth goal is a permanent goal to ensure the “comprehensive protection 
of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad” 
while “promoting the Russian language and strengthening its positions in the 
world”.55 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was estimated that some 20 
million ethnic Russian were residing outside of Russia throughout the region.56 
Russia’s most recent foreign policy in Ukraine has displayed that it is willing to use 
whatever tools necessary to defends ethnic Russian’s rights and interests abroad. In 
2009, changes were made to Russia’s Law of Defense, establishing a long range of 
conditions that allow for Russia to unilaterally defend its citizens and Russian 
speakers in other countries.57 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has claimed 
that tens of thousands of Russian citizens are living in Syria, which given Russia’s 
current foreign policy of protecting its citizens abroad, may be something they cannot 
or will not ignore.58 
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7) The final goal is to facilitate “the development of a constructive dialogue 
and partnership relations between civilizations in the interests of enhancing accord 
among various cultures and confessions and ensuring their mutual enrichment”.59 This 
goal is related to more of a soft power approach of promoting language and culture, 
which Russia utilizes in its region, uniting many under the commonality of the 
Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church. For many Russians, references 
to encouraging dialogue among civilizations has been challenged internally and 
externally in the region by the spread of Islamic radicalism, which will be discussed 
further in Chapter 4.  
 
As displayed above, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept is a thorough outline 
and description of Russia’s foreign goals and objectives.  The document forms the 
basis of the Russian governments agenda and approach to the international system. 
Overall, the Foreign Policy Concept displays that Russian foreign policy is driven by 
goals meant to strengthen and secure Russia’s international status, which will enable 
Russia to (1) pursue and secure its future interests and (2) preserve the growth and 
relatively peaceful security environment its has recently experienced. For Russia, 
economic growth and success are the keys to sustaining Russia’s interests both 
internationally and domestically. The goals outlined above are extremely important in 
analyzing Russia’s general foreign policy, which is necessary to further examine 
Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria and its support for the al-Assad regime. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Ibid.	  
	  	   36	  
Russia, a major determinant of foreign policy-making and the foreign policy goals 
pursued by the Kremlin is the role of identity. The historical legacy of Russia’s 
empire and its Soviet superpower status has had its effect on shaping Russia’s 
identity, its goals, and how it sees itself in the future. The next section of this chapter 
will examine how identity has factored into Russian foreign policy and Russia’s goal 
of great power status.  
 
3.4   Russian Identity 
Questions regarding Russia’s foreign policy have resulted in a perpetual 
debate regarding Russia’s identity and its role in geopolitics, such as: are Russians 
Slavic, European, or Eurasian? Huntington emphasized the importance of culture and 
its role as the dominating source of conflict, arguing that international politics would 
develop into two categories: the West versus the Rest.60 Is Russia a part of the West 
or part of the Rest? Neumann states that the activity of delineating a Western ‘other’ 
from the Russian ‘self’ has helped influence the formation of the Russian identity.61 
This debate regarding Russian identity and their affinity with the West has shaped 
Russia’s political and social mindset influencing its perceived power status and 
ultimately its foreign policy. “One of the keys roles of Russian foreign policy has 
been to define how Russians (and others) perceive Russia, with the hope that Russian 
foreign policy “will help Russia become Russia”.62 This section will focus on the 
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connection that exists between Russia’s identity, its national interests, and ambition 
as a major international power. 
Russia as a nation-state has only existed since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Before the break-up of the USSR, Russia was a multi-national empire 
that behaved and identified as such. Scholars have examined the role of Russia’s 
historical legacy as a great power and its impact on Russia’s contemporary great 
power mindset, arguing that “Russia’s history and the way in which that history has 
shaped Russia’s outlook helps us understand the way in which it approaches problems 
like those posed by Syria’s civil war”.63 Since the mid-1990s, Russia has experienced 
a renewal of Russian nationalism that can be credited to the failure of Russia’s 
economic market reforms and the failure of democratic politics to focus on issues of 
ethnicity. One of the main components of “contemporary Russian culture has been 
the traditional messianic view that Russia is a unique country which must pursue its 
own path of development that is necessarily different from that of the West, and will 
have a special, distinctive role to play in the future”.64 From this perspective, Russia 
has been able to pick from which aspects of the West it wishes to adopt and discard 
concepts it does not find favorable for its national interests. For Russians, their view 
of the West and Western culture are used to explore and strengthen their own country, 
which will always remains their greatest priority.  
By focusing on social matters such as ideas, agency, and norms, constructivist 
theory provides an approach to analyzing Russia’s foreign policy that emphasizes the 	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inter-subjective shared ideas that influence behavior and establish the identities and 
interests of actors.65 Internal and external state identities are institutionalized on 
domestic and international levels, influenced by various domestic and international 
factors. At the domestic level, identities are developed alongside myths, traditions, 
and institutions to protect them.66 At the international level, “states seek to enact their 
identities in interstate normative structures, including regimes and security 
communities”.67 Russian self-perception is that of a nation that has reclaimed its 
strength and has fully recuperated from the systemic collapse of the 1990s. Russia has 
emerged with an identity that no longer identifies itself in terms of Western or 
European, but has instead sought to restore Russia’s natural identity. Characteristics 
of this identity include “a strong and centralized authoritative state in Moscow, social 
protections for the population, secure sovereign borders, and, consequently, 
engagement with Western hegemony on a strictly selective basis”.68 This identity 
includes what scholars have labeled the ‘imperial syndrome’, which is credited to the 
sense of a past empire, while bolstering the current and future Russian policy in its 
entitled imperial mission.69 “The national identity goals of Russian foreign policy can 
be summarized simply by two basic interests: to be recognized as first among equals 
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among the post-Soviet states, and to maintain its status as a great power in the world 
at large”. 70 
 A major aspect of Russia’s global status as a great power is its perceived 
notion of indispensability among the international community. This perceived notion 
has two very important aspects for how Russia view’s its global status and 
participates in world events. First, it assumes Russia is entitled to belong to every 
major international organization. This is an extremely important because “while 
NATO is gradually turning into the central element in the overall organization of the 
European political space, Russia is denied access to this structure”.71  Second, it 
assumes that solutions cannot be found to major international problems without 
Russian participation. “This would involve Moscow moderating Washington’s 
‘excessive and not always wisely used might by, among other things, playing the role 
of mediator and alternative diplomatic and political centre’- an aim which, it was 
claimed, other powers (for example, France and China) desired it to play and which 
was crucial to Russia’s continuing identity as a ‘great power’”.72 Overall, Russia 
views itself as a power indispensible to the international system and expects to be 
treated as such. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new era of international politics 
emerged in which struggles for multi-polarity have been shaped by those defending 
the status-quo and others hoping to revise the structure of the international system. 	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Russia has attempted to re-establish itself as a pole of power separate from the West 
as a means of advancing its great power identity. Russia’s foreign policy has been to 
re-establish and promote a strong Russia, shaped by identity politics. Russia has 
utilized its relationships with many countries to bolster its power status and separate 
itself as a distinct power. The following section will focus on Russia’s key 
relationships that have been significant to its goal of achieving great power status, 
specifically in regards to the current crisis in Syria. For Russia, its support for the al-
Assad regime has both hindered and advanced its goals of great power status. By 
examining how Russia’s decision to support the al-Assad regime has affected its 
status and relationships among select nations involved, the following section will 
display how Russia has utilized its support for the Syrian regime in an attempt at self-
perceived great power status through its foreign policy. 
 
3.5   Russian Relations with the West 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was forced to adapt to the collapse 
of their political, economic, and military systems, which helped undermine 
confidence and trust in the idea of liberalization. The overall collapse of the state and 
the failure of shock therapy and Western investment left Russia alienated, with a 
populace that felt the strategic partnership with the West was not beneficial to Russia. 
Eventually the economy stabilized but the adverse side effects drove the elites and the 
general public to develop “resentment toward Western nations, particularly the 
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United States”.73 Tsygankov states that for Russia the West “played an especially 
prominent role in creating for Russia the system of meanings in which to defend 
international choices” whose “influences were to be emulated or contained, but never 
ignored”. 74 While defending Russian interest globally, Putin’s policy has been able to 
frame some of Russia’s interests to be compatible with Western values, as means of 
advancing Russia’s influence and power status in the international system. The 
following portions of this section will examine Russia’s relations with the United 
States and Europe, focusing on how Russia utilized these relationships to expand its 
influence and power amongst the international community.  The issue of Russia’s 
support for the al-Assad will also be addressed, examining how Russia’s decision to 
support the Syrian regime has affected those relationships.  
 
Russian Relations with the United States 
After the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, Russia joined the U.S. 
‘war on terror’, making Russia an extremely important ally to the West, but interest 
and relations between the two countries would not stay parallel. Many scholars apply 
a more antagonistic approach for explaining Russian foreign policy towards the 
United States, while other scholars argue that Russia’s relationship with the US is one 
of competition, with Russian foreign policy aimed at a “plan to rebuild Russia as a 
great power with a global reach”.75 Lo argues that Russian foreign policy is 	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overwhelmingly Westerncentric, although not pro-Western, because “there was no 
significant area of international affairs where Washington did not play a leading 
role”.76 “Fueled in part by the massive inflow of petro-dollars, Moscow’s self-
confidence grew over the several years prior to the late 2008 global economic 
downturn, and officials and observers in Europe and the United States expressed 
growing concern about what they viewed as an increasingly contrarian Russian 
foreign policy”.77 This can be observed in Russia’s opposition to a US defense missile 
system in Europe, its opposition of Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership, 
along with opposing Ukrainian EU membership, and its support for regimes that 
oppose American influence such as China and Iran. In many international disputes, 
Russian foreign policy has been to promote conflicts between the U.S. and its allies as 
an attempt to weaken U.S. power globally, as in Syria. While the United States and 
Russia do share some of the same goals and interests, ultimately, Russian relations 
with the U.S. have soured due to Moscow’s fears that U.S. policies challenge 
Russia’s power and indispensability. Putin’s policy has been to restore Russia’s place 
among the multipolar world as a great power and an equal amongst the United States.  
A major point of contention between Russia and the United States has been 
Russia’s stance regarding NATO: its exclusion from the organization, NATO’s 
continued post-Cold War expansion, and its lack of trust for past NATO operations. 
To the West, NATO has been deemed a powerful, symbolic, and irreplaceable 
security community, which the United States utilizes to circumvent the UN in matters 	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of Western interests. For Russia, a major problem with NATO lies in Russia’s 
exclusion from attaining membership, where NATO has become “an organization 
whose essential identity and history is correctly understood as one of cultural, or even 
civilizational commonality centered around the shared democratic foundations of its 
members”, which has left Russia as an outsider unable to yield influence in a major 
security structure that continues to strengthen US and European relations.78 Williams 
and Neumann claim that NATO and its further expansion forced the Russian 
leadership to choose between two paths, arguing  “Russia could either be an 
apprentice striving to join Western civilization, thus entailing an acceptance of NATO 
enlargement as inevitable or positive; or, alternatively, Russia could be a counter-
civilizational force, entailing opposition to NATO enlargement”.79 This option to 
oppose NATO has resulted in continued post-Cold War great power politics, leaving 
Russia engaged in a theater of strategic conflict with the West, while supporting 
regimes like Assad in an attempt to counter American hegemony. 
The relationship between Russia and the United States has been riddled with 
contention as both countries vie for power in the global arena, where Russia has 
supported the possibility of a more multipolar world.  Putin has blamed the lack of 
cooperation between the US and Russia because “the United States continued to view 
itself as the sole superpower”, which acts with an “imperial attitude”, that has only 
strengthened the “fundamental cultural differences” between the two countries.80 	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Putin recently argued that the United States’ policy has been to ignore international 
law, choosing a policy “by the rule of the gun”, where the U.S. either forces approval 
from international organizations for its acts or ignores them.81 Charap argues 
“Russia’s stance on the international action on the Syrian crisis has more to do with 
anxieties about the implications of US power than it does with Syria itself”.82 In the 
case of Syria, the US-led coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
has been condemned by the Russian government due to its lack of UN approval and 
its violation of Syrian sovereignty (which will be discussed in Chapter 4). Russia’s 
decision to back the al-Assad regime and its current annexation of Ukrainian land, 
resulting in economic sanctions against Russia, has further worsened the relationships 
between the US and Russia.  
 
Russian Relations with Europe 
Europe plays a central role to Russia’s economy, with the EU being Russia’s 
largest trading partner, but this relationship is mutual, as Russia is the EU’s third 
largest trading partner. In Russia’s most important economic sector, its energy sector, 
Europe is irreplaceably significant, since Russia is the largest exporter of oil and 
natural gas to the European Union. “Russian leaders do not view the EU as a major 
strategic power but as a valuable twofold instrument: an economic engine from where 
Russia can tap investment, technology, and trade; and a U.S. partner that Moscow can 
help decouple and maximize its own influence to decrease the American role in 	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Europe”.83 The significance behind Russia’s energy interdependence with Europe, 
even amidst sanctions against Russia due to its actions in with Ukraine, may present 
tension between Europe and the US. “Some Members of Congress, U.S. officials, and 
European leaders have claimed that European dependence on Russian energy and 
Russia’s growing influence in segments of Europe’s energy distribution infrastructure 
poses a long-term threat to transatlantic relations”.84 
Russia’s strategy towards the EU can be viewed under three major positions. 
The first position pursues direct relations with the EU, not as a member or potential 
member, but as an equal partner. The second position focuses on bilateral ties with 
major EU states that are more likely to offer more favorable accommodations to 
Russia. While Russia does cooperate with EU institutions, it prefers to collaborate 
with individual states to pursue Russia’s economic and political interests.  The third 
position views the EU as a competitor, both regionally and internationally, which is 
capable of attracting post-Soviet states away from Moscow’s influence. Bugajski 
claims that “it’s emphasis on human rights and pluralistic democracy, the EU also 
threatens the Kremlin’s sovereign democracy model and even the long-term survival 
of the Russian Federation”.85 
The relationship between Russia and Europe is constantly affected by the 
political and economic environment of the continent, which has most recently been 
influenced by Russia’s invasion of the Crimea in Ukraine. Russia’s actions in the 	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Crimea have left uncertainty over Russia’s intentions in Europe, with European 
politicians viewing Russia more as a potential threat than a partner. Most recently, the 
US and many European countries have imposed harsh economic and financial 
sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, which has affected the 
Russian stock index and has caused depreciation in the Russian Ruble. Russia’s 
policy towards the Crimea, sanctions against Russia, and economic dependence 
between European countries and Russia has resulted in a split between those 
European countries that treat Russia with pragmatism and engagement and those that 
treat Russia as a threat. While Russia has sought to extend its power and influence in 
the region, “a game-changing narrative has therefore emerged of Putin’s Russia as a 
threat to peace and stability in Europe, and as an adversarial power that flouts 
European principles and values”.86 
Compared to the United States, the EU and its member states have not played 
a substantial role in the Syrian crisis, but has provided the Syrian opposition with 
support against the regime. Along with support for the anti-regime opposition, the EU 
has implemented sanctions against the al-Assad regime. The sanctions encompass 
over 17 restrictive measures aimed at pressuring the Syrian regime, causing 
considerable damage to the Syrian economy.87 Russia has managed to provide the 
Syrian regime with financial and military support despite international sanctions 
against the regime, but it is undeniable that international sanctions against the regime 
have hindered the regimes revenues while further isolating the regime from the 	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international community. While EU-Russian relations are vital due to economic and 
energy significance, European sanctions against the al-Assad regime have strained 
EU-Russian relations. Many European leaders have called for pressure to instigate 
Assad’s departure, which has only polarized Russian-European relations further. This 
pressure has been compounded by the Russian annexation of the Crimea in Ukraine 
and European sanctions against the Russian Federation. Ultimately, disagreements 
regarding the Syrian Civil War has potential to further debilitate relations between 
Europe and Russia depending on the future status of Syria’s regional security and the 
future of the al-Assad regime.  
 
3.6   Russian Relations with the Middle East  
 Russia’s renewed interest in the Middle East has been a result of major global 
and regional developments, such as the events of the Arab Spring. In an effort to 
upgrade its international status and power, Russia has been playing a more active role 
in events in the Middle East in an attempt to restore its status as an influential 
regional actor. Nichol argues that Russia’s “role in the Iranian sanctions agreement, 
the Middle East Quartet, the International Conference on Syria, chemical weapons 
removal from Syria, and other Middle Eastern issues have led some observers to 
speak of “Russia’s return” to the region, although most argue that Russia’s moves are 
mainly diplomatic and reflect limited capabilities and interests”.88 Russia’s strategic 
interests in the Middle East include security of its southern border, decreasing 
influence of the United States, and preventing competition from Gulf States in 	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European and Asian energy markets. Russia’s increased involvement in the Middle 
East has not signaled the formation of a coherent policy in the region, but is 
formulated instead as a reaction to US policy or an attempt to weaken American 
influence in the region. While the US maintains the dominant power in the Middle 
East, democratization of many Arab states have conflicted, rather than assist, Western 
geopolitical interests in the region.  Countries like Russia and China have utilized the 
declining Western influence through pragmatic relations that has provided 
alternatives to Western interests.  Russian and Chinese support for the al-Assad 
regime in the UNSC has undermined Western interests in the region, allowing Russia 
to position itself as a growing regional power.  
While Russia has managed to maintain various relationships with countries in 
the Middle East, Russia’s decision to back the al-Assad regime has provoked 
reactions from many countries in the region, which have included protests at Russian 
embassies in countries such as Libya and Lebanon. Among the states in the Middle 
East, six states have opposed the al-Assad regime and Russian support for the regime: 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Libya, Qatar, and Egypt, but international and regional 
attention has temporarily shifted from Assad to the rise of the Islamic State (IS), a 
jihadist militant group in Syria and Iraq. The majority of states in the Middle East 
have joined the U.S.-led coalition against the threat posed by the terrorist state, which 
has turned attention even further away from the conflict between opposition groups in 
Syria and the regime. It is important to note that while the majority of the states in the 
Middle East do not support the rise of IS, some states did play a supporting role in 
economic and military funding to Syrian opposition groups prior to the formation. 
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External funding to the Syrian opposition has affected Russian relations with various 
countries due to their additional support of terrorist activities during and after the 
First and Second Chechen Wars. Charap argues that “decision-makers in Moscow are 
quick to point out that the emirate and its predecessors were directly supported by 
entities in some of the Arab countries now leading the call for Assad’s departure”.89  
The following portion will examine the relationships between Russia and key 
states in the Middle East, focusing on how Russia’s decision to support the al-Assad 
regime has either hindered or helped Russian influence and relations in the region. 
Select countries were chosen due to their relationships with Russia and their 
involvement in the Syrian Civil War. 
The conflict in Syria has had an impact on relations between Russia and Saudi 
Arabia. Russia has accused Saudi Arabia, along with the US and other countries in 
the Gulf, of provoking the events of the crisis in Syria. During the beginning of the 
conflict, Saudi Arabia provided economic and military assistance to various 
opposition factions fighting the al-Assad regime, which resulted in further 
fragmentation of opposition forces. Together with Qatar, Saudi has attempted to 
weaken Iranian-Syrian relations through support for the Syrian opposition and 
suspending Syria’s membership in the Arab League. In addition to funding opposition 
forces in Syria, Saudi has been vocal about its desire for increased pressure on Assad, 
while encouraging the US to have a more active presence in the conflict. Saudi’s 
assistance to the Syrian opposition has worsened Russian-Saudi relations as Russia 
views Saudi’s attempt at funding opposition groups as supporting Islamic radicalism 	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in the region. This mindset is reminiscent of the First and Second Chechen Wars, 
when Russia accused Saudi Arabia of supporting Chechen terrorists and the spread of 
radical Islam in the Caucasus Emirate. Both countries have been on opposite sides 
regarding their support for Iran and its nuclear program.  Overall, the current situation 
in Syria has worsened relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia, further dividing the 
region as both countries attempt to increase their influence through their involvement 
in the crisis.  
Russia is Turkey’s second largest trading partner, with a strong, growing 
economic partnership in energy cooperation. Despite disagreements regarding the 
conflict in Syria, Russia and Turkey have been able to continue and accomplish new 
developments regarding economic interests, such as the Turkish Stream, a proposed 
gas pipeline that would bring natural gas from Russia to Turkey. Politically, tensions 
between the two countries have grown as both Russia and Turkey vie for influence 
and power in the same regions. Russian-Turkish relations have worsened due to 
Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime, while Turkey has been adamant about 
calling for the fall of the regime. Kunchins claims that Russian support for the regime 
and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition has “exposed fundamental differences 
in interests and policies between Ankara and Moscow, with Turkey siding with the 
forces of political change in the Middle East while Russia seeks to uphold the status 
quo”.90 As the international community focuses on the threat posed by ISIS in the 
region, Turkey continues to demand that action be taken against the Syrian regime in 
exchange for future Turkish cooperation in the US-led coalition against the Islamic 	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State. As the conflict intensifies in the region, the different policies regarding the 
regime in Syria has challenged the relationship between Turkey and Russia. While 
both countries continue to disagree regarding the conflict in Syria, the main focus 
between Turkey and Russia has been their bilateral economic interests, which are too 
significant to be disrupted over their disagreements regarding Syria.  
For over three decades, Syria and Iran have shared an alliance that has been an 
important presence for the changing political landscape of the Middle East. The 
relationship that has existed between the two countries has been based on defensive 
policies of protection against Western, Israeli, and Iraqi offensive strategies in the 
region. Syrian-Iranian relations have been strengthened by the inclusion of an strong 
ally to both nations, Russia, which Alexey Malashenko claims has been labeled a new 
“axis of evil” consisting of Iran, Russia, and Syria”.91 Relations between Iran and 
Russia have been crucial to assisting the al-Assad regimes survival despite 
international pressure. Both Russia and Iran have provided the regime with the 
majority of its external military and financial assistance, while Russia has also 
provided the regime with international protection through its vote in the UN Security 
Council. Overall, support for the Syrian regime has not only facilitated Iranian and 
Russian economic and military interests, but has also provided an alliance that has 
stood against Western intervention in the Middle East in an attempt to decrease 
American hegemony in the region. Ultimately, the relationship between Russian and 
Iran has been a major supporting force behind Syrian sovereignty and the al-Assad 
regimes survival. 	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For Russia, the most important challenge in the Middle East is fate of the al-
Assad regime and the current exacerbation of events in the crisis in Syria, which 
could weaken Russia’s policy and influence in the region. The current instability in 
the Middle East has allowed Moscow to utilize its regional power as a key player in 
averting American policy in the region. Russia’s policy in the Middle East can be 
observed as a reaction to the challenge of competition between the US and Russia in 
various arenas, such as the issue of Syria and IS in the Middle East and the issue of 
Ukraine in East Europe. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s 
dedicated political support for the al-Assad regime in Syria has permitted Russia to 
influentially project its power in the Middle East. While Russian support for the al-
Assad regime has not affected its economic relationships with countries in the Middle 
East, strategically, Russia’s support for the regime has been viewed as an attempt at 
suppression of radical Sunni influence in the region, affecting its relationships with 
many states in the Middle East.  
 
3.7   Russian Relations with Syria 
Since the beginning of the ongoing civil war in Syria, Russia has strongly 
supported the al-Assad regime, becoming its primary protector among the 
international community. Russian interests in Syria have always been strategic in 
nature, but the current instability in the Middle East has made Russian foreign policy 
in the region more sensitive to secure and defend these interests. Russia has utilized 
its relationship with the ‘unpopular’ regime as greater attempt at expanding Russian 
power and influence while challenging American geopolitical advances. Russia’s 
	  	   53	  
support for the regime has been justified under principles of international law, such as 
defending the sovereignty of states and the principle of non-intervention in states 
internal affairs, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. While Russia has employed 
many relationships with ‘rogue’ nations in the Middle East as an attempt at gaining 
influence in countries that oppose Western policies, few states in Middle East are free 
from American influence. Syria has provided Russia with advantages independent 
from American control, such as access to the Mediterranean and a position of 
influence in the Middle East. For Russia, its strong relationship with the al-Assad 
regime allows Russia to play a more active role in the Middle East and restores 
Russia’s status in the regional as a powerful actor.  
Russian economic and military interests with Syria should not be 
overestimated as the main motivation behind Putin’s support for the al-Assad regime. 
Scholars have focused on the economic partnership between the two countries as a 
major factor behind the support given between each country, but it is important to 
note that Russia and Syria are not major trading partners; therefore, analyzing their 
relationship based on economic interests does not provide a sufficient explanation. 
92Scholars have also focused on Russian interest in the Mediterranean military base in 
Tartus, but Russia’s interest in the port is more symbolic than strategic.93 A Russian 
military presence in the Middle East is unrealistic and the Russian government has 
made no effort to develop such presence. Russia’s policy towards Syria cannot be 
understood if reduced to mere arguments of interests; instead, Russian foreign policy 	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towards Syria can be viewed as part of an actor-centered process geared towards 
power expansion and Western opposition that is influenced by various internal 
factors, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. While economic factors may not be the 
driving force behind support for the regime, it is impossible to exclude these factors 
as having some influence over Russian foreign policy. Arms delivery contracts have 
played an economic and strategic role in strengthening cooperation between the two 
countries, while militarily supporting the regime and signaling to the West that 
sanctions would not prevent trade between the states.  
Scholars have focused on the historical relationships between Syria and 
Russia, focusing on a continuation of relations, but this historical bond is purely 
symbolic due to the different dimensions that constitute the current relations.94 Soviet-
Syrian relations were more instrumental in nature, focusing not on identity or 
ideology, without the historical affinity utilized in the countries contemporary 
diplomacy. Scholars have argued “it is plausible that the close association between 
the USSR and Syria has some continuing resonance in the mindset of Russia’s current 
security and foreign policy leadership, generating a sense of solidarity”.95 After the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was forced to retreat from its international obligations 
and experienced a sort of ‘thaw’ in relations with the majority of states in the Middle 
East, but Putin has preserved and strengthened many aspects of previous Soviet-
Syrian relations in order to establish Russia’s influence in the region.  
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At a regional level, factors influencing Russian policy towards Syria are based 
on concerns of regional instability. Since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, both 
the al-Assad regime and the Russian government warned of the growing extremist 
threat that existed amongst some of the Syrian opposition groups. For Russia, the 
Syrian regimes removal would allow for the more radical opposition groups to fill the 
power vacuum from the regime. Putin has warned of the potential expansion of the 
radical movement from Syria into regions of Russia, specifically the Caucasus, which 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
One of the most important issues regarding Russian involvement in Syria has 
been the negotiation for the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. In August 
2014, chemical agents were used in an area outside of Damascus, controlled by 
opposition forces, killing hundreds of civilians. The attack quickly became one of the 
most important events of the Syrian Civil War, leaving the international community 
divided on whom to place blame. Many Western and Arab governments have blamed 
the al-Assad regime, which has been blamed on multiple occasions throughout the 
crisis of other chemical weapons attacks against opposition forces and civilians, while 
the Russian government blamed the opposition forces, stating that the attacks where 
used to facilitate external intervention in the crisis. The attacks in Syria crossed the 
Obama administrations ‘red line’, which left the president suggesting a military 
response as a result of the attacks, the potential for future use of chemical weapons, 
and the potential of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal falling into the hands of the 
opposition forces. In a successful maneuver to avert any retaliatory military responses 
against the regime, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov presented a diplomatic 
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solution that would establish international control over Syria’s chemical weapons 
arsenal while avoiding strikes or external intervention in the crisis.  
The proposal signals one of the most important successful negotiations during 
the Syrian Civil War. With the help of the Russian government, the Syrian regime 
was able to satisfy the international community through the process of declaring, 
forfeiting, and destructing their chemical weapons arsenal. The proposal also 
demanded and succeeded in facilitating Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, which requires all members to eliminate their chemical weapons 
stockpiles and facilities. The Russian government utilized its positions as Assad’s 
main ally to bring about an agreement that would prevent any military action against 
the Syrian regime, all the while increasing Russia’s role as a major power in the 
conflict. Without Russia’s successful proposal and the US-Russian initiative for 
removing Syria’s chemical weapons, one the most important issues surrounding the 
civil war could have gone unresolved, escalating into strikes against the regime. Putin 
has been eager to mediate negotiations and resolutions to issues regarding Syria and 
the al-Assad regime, as an attempt to demonstrate the indispensability of Russia in the 
potential resolution to the crisis. Without the Russian proposal, which the US was 
weary the regime would accept, the United States would have been unable to 
facilitate an agreement between the parties for the weapons removal, leaving the 
entire international community at risk.  
Russia has utilized its position as one of Assad’s only allies by negotiating 
and mediating many of the international community’s attempts at resolving the Syrian 
crisis.   In early 2013, Russia hosted a Russian-Arab Forum with representatives from 
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various Middle Eastern countries in an attempt at resolving issues surrounding Syria. 
Russia has used its position in the conflict to display the significance of its mediation 
efforts, making Russia’s involvement a necessity for peace or negotiations. Russia’s 
goal in negotiating with the international community, the Syrian regime, and less 
frequently, the Syrian opposition has been to demonstrate the indispensability of 
Russia’s position and influence in the crisis. Russia has utilized its position as one of 
the Syrian regimes only allies, using every available asset and opportunity to promote 
Russia’s interests, influence, and power amongst the international system.  
 
This chapter has examined Russia general foreign policy goals, as displayed in 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, while linking Russia’s self-identification as a great 
power to its foreign policy agenda. Linking the connection of Russian identity to 
Russia’s foreign policy provides a more comprehensive explanation and justification 
for Russia’s overall goals and actions. These goals have been applied to Russia’s 
foreign policy to expand its influence and establish its identity in the international 
system, but as Russia pursues its goals, it finds itself threated by other countries 
pursuing their own policies that counter Russian interests. This is especially true in 
the case of countries in Russia’s periphery, such as Syria, where Russia exerts a large 
amount of influence and is able to advance its foreign policy goals. This chapter has 
attempted to display Russia’s relations with key participants in the Syrian Civil War, 
emphasizing how Russia has applied its policy in an attempt to advance its interests, 
power, and influence amongst the international system.  Russian support for the al-
Assad regime has helped facilitate Russia’s goals internationally, regionally, and 
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domestically. For Russia, the removal of the al-Assad regime would spoil Russia’s 
goals at increasing its power and influence in the Middle East, which would lessen 
Russia’s influence and potentially strengthen Western influence in the region. This 
chapter has presented an analysis of Russia’s support for the Syrian regime at the 
systemic level, while the following chapter will address factors of influence at the 
state level.  
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Chapter 4- Internal Factors 
 
 The prior chapter outlined Russian foreign policy and focused on Russia’s 
relationships with other countries and how its decision to support the al-Assad regime 
has affected those relationships, but it is important to address how many aspects of 
Russian foreign policy have been influenced by domestic factors. Knowledge of the 
main domestic influences of Russia’s foreign policy-making is necessary to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding of Russia’s foreign policy. For every nation, 
domestic politics inform, inspire, and restrict foreign policy, affecting a nations 
decisions and its outcomes.  Scholars like James Rosenau have stressed the necessity 
to examine external variables on internal politics and internal variables on external 
politics.96 Russia remains a country with immense internal problems, some legacies 
from Soviet policies, but others that have arose out of the changing international 
landscape. Under Putin, domestic political procedures have dramatically influenced 
and altered how Russia’s government operates. Bureaucratic and institutional changes 
under Putin have distorted both government operations and the way the government 
communicates with the Russian people. As these operations continue to shift towards 
a more autocratic, central government, both domestic and foreign policy alike are 
affected. 
 A nineteenth century proverb states, “Russia is never as strong as she appears, 
and never as weak as she appears”.97 In a 2002 speech, Putin revised the proverb, 	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stating, “Russia was never as strong as it wanted to be and never as weak as it thought 
to be”.98 Great power legacies, fueled by revenues from natural resources, have 
resulted in an assertive Russian foreign policy focused on validating Russia as a great 
power in the international system. Domestic factors have and continue to be a major 
force behind Russian foreign policy-making, therefore, it is impossible to dismiss 
Russia’s internal factors that continue to threaten and/or support Russian domestic 
and foreign policy goals. The energy rich nation has been plagued with serious social, 
economic, and political challenges that threaten Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Weak 
political institutions and a resource dependent economy have strained Russia’s 
attempts at great power status. This chapter will attempt to present the most 
significant domestic influences, be it threats or opportunities, to Russia’s foreign 
policy towards the al-Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War.   
This chapter will outline four major influences to Russian foreign policy, 
specifically in the case of the Syrian Civil War, that have influenced Russia’s 
decision to back the al-Assad regime despite international pressure. The first section 
of this chapter will focus on the issue of regime type, examining how regime 
affiliation and the mutual fear for regime survival have influenced Moscow’s support 
for the al-Assad regime. The second portion of this chapter will focus on Russia’s 
energy policies, addressing the power behind Russia’s energy sector and its influence 
on government affairs. The third section of this chapter will attempt to correlate how 
internal conflicts and the rise of radical Islamic groups domestically, regionally, and 
internationally have influenced Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime. Any 
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discussion regarding Russia’s foreign policy and its political agenda cannot ignore 
Russia’s concerns for its domestically driven threats, such as the continued violence 
in the Caucasus, which this thesis argues is Russia’s most formidable domestic threat. 
The final factor examined is the influence of the government controlled Russian 
media and how the Kremlin utilizes this outlet for public support for its policy in 
Syria. For this thesis, these factors play the largest role in influencing Russia’s 
foreign policy towards Syria. By focusing on how these factors influence Russian 
foreign policy-making, this chapter will provide a more comprehensive analysis how 
why the Russian government continues to support the al-Assad regime in Syria.  
 
4.1   Regime Type 
 There is an obvious affinity between the regime type of Russian President 
Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which is a system of sovereign 
democracy or ‘smart authoritarianism’99 focused of self-survival. “Similarities include 
the political and economic dominance of a narrow closed caste of a clearly defined 
type of origin; unaccountable presidential rule; the unparalleled clout of the security 
sector; and the fiction of belated political reform”.100 While the removal of the regime 
in Syria may not have direct influence on the status quo of Russian domestic politics, 
unseating a ‘legitimate’ regime could demonstrate the potential weaknesses of 
regimes similar to Putin or al-Assad’s ‘smart authoritarianism’. These regimes 
challenge the traditional knowledge that liberal democracy is the norm that all 	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countries should try to achieve. “Russia’s support for authoritarian governments is 
intended to entice these countries under its political and security umbrella and 
delegitimize the West for its criticisms of autocratic policies”.101 The growth of more 
authoritarian regimes, such as Russia and China, has alarmed scholars and political 
scientists alike, because these countries provide a model that challenges Western 
norms and power.  
The fall of other authoritative regimes in the Middle East, such as Mubarak’s 
Egypt and Qaddafi’s Libya, have only strengthened Russian fear of regime change for 
the al-Assad regime. “Many in the Russian foreign-policy establishment believe the 
string of US-led interventions that have resulted in regime change since the end of the 
Cold War- Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya- is a threat to the stability of the 
international system and potentially ‘regime stability’ in Russia itself and its 
autocratic allies in its neighborhood”.102 “Accepting the principle of military action 
for regime change against repressive and undemocratic regimes would make Russian 
allies- if not Russia itself- and neighbors in the former Soviet space vulnerable to 
international interference”.103 Russian support for regime security is extremely 
important due to the various ‘revolutions’ that took place in Russia’s former Soviet 
allies, such as Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, where support from Moscow has 
been guaranteed for similar regimes from external interference or intervention. 
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Ultimately, Russia has been the main supporter of the al-Assad regime and will 
continue to support any attempt at removing the Syrian president. 
The ongoing civil war in Syria has displayed the fundamental differences 
between Russia’s approach to intervention versus that of most of the international 
community. Russia does not believe the Security Council should authorize 
intervention to promote the removal of a sitting government or regime change. In the 
case of Syria, claims for humanitarian intervention have lost their weight with 
outright calls for regime change against the al-Assad regime. In a speech given by 
President Barack Obama in 2011, regime change was announced as a top U.S. 
priority stating that “the time has come for President Assad to step aside”.104 Obama 
stressed the US commitment to bring democracy to Syria, arguing “we will support 
this outcome by pressuring President Assad to get out of the way of this transition”.105  
In Moscow, calls for U.S. intervention in Syria are viewed as a policy for ousting a 
government whose policy contradicts Western interests, as displayed by the removal 
of other regimes in the region. Russia’s opposition to regime change is based not only 
on the norms of sovereignty and noninterference but also in concern about what 
happens after regimes are removed, which will be discussed later in this chapter. In 
the case of Syria, the current spread of radical Islamic groups in the region presents a 
threat to regional and international security, which Russia views would be made 
worse without the al-Assad regime.  
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Many countries, including the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, have 
demanded international action or assistance in removing the al-Assad regime. To 
prevent the removal of the regime, Russia has provided the Syrian regime with a 
diplomatic umbrella by vetoing three UN Security Council resolutions aimed at 
multinational military intervention in Syria. For Russia, the removal of the Syrian 
regime would result in dire consequences, which will be discussed further below. 
Russian support for regime security in Syria can be linked to the Kremlin’s 
preoccupation with Russian domestic state order, state sovereignty, and most 
importantly, regime affiliation. This is central to understanding why, after the 
removal of the Qaddafi regime in Libya and the uprisings from the Arab Spring, 
Russia has so adamantly fought against any attempt at removing the al-Assad regime 
in Syria. For Russia, Western support for the removal of a regime amidst internal 
crisis has presented a threatening precedent that worries those in power. Both Syria 
and Russia share a common regime type that allow for the exploitation of power by 
those in power, but for Russia, these governments are perfectly legitimate and regime 
removal will continue to be an option the Russian government will not support.   
 
4.2  Energy and Oil 
Russia has the largest oil and natural gas reserves outside of the Middle East, 
which is one of the country’s greatest assets, playing a major role in the political and 
economic success of the country and its leaders. Russia’s economy has implemented 
a petro-state system that favors isolation over competitiveness, with highly 
centralized, majority state-owned companies, such as Gazprom and Rosneft. Trenin 
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outlines the connection between Russian bureaucrats and the corporate interest behind 
Russia’s foreign policy making stating, “under Putin’s presidency, the Russian state 
has turned into something like Russia Inc., with top Kremlin staffers and senior 
ministers sitting on the boards of various state-owned corporations and taking an 
active interest in their progress and profits”.106 It is important to note that the energy 
sector of any country cannot be considered exclusively economic due to its strategic 
significance, but in the case of Russia, the politicization of its energy is extremely 
severe. Russia’s energy exports have resulted in substantial economic recovery and 
have also been utilized to re-establish Russia as a major global power among the 
international community. The “political significance of the energy sector in Russia 
can be gauged from the fact that oil revenues alone fund roughly half of the federal 
budget and made up a quarter of GDP in 2010”.107 It is important to note that Russia’s 
reliance on oil revenues and natural gas has left Russia’s economic growth subject to 
the unpredictable changes of world prices.   
 Russia’s official energy policy states, “Russia’s mighty energy sector (is) an 
instrument for the conduct of internal and external policy’ and that ‘the role of the 
country in world energy markets to a large extent determines its geopolitical 
influence”.108 Russia has utilized its oil and gas sector as a foreign policy lever to 
successfully reinvent its great power status in the international community. Russia has 
sought to strengthen its position in the energy market, building oil pipelines in the 	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regions and monopolizing gas prices on its energy dependent neighbors. Russia’s 
state-owned energy companies, such as Gazprom, are being used to expand and 
secure Russia’s regional and global energy power and influence. Jurado asserts that 
“the energy policies pursued by the Putin administration-including the re-
nationalization of Russia’s energy reserves, the creation of state monopolies over the 
use of Russian pipelines, and the limitations placed on foreign ownership of Russian 
energy assets- are widely interpreted, especially by Western governments and oil and 
gas companies, as posing obstacles to international cooperation in the area”.109 It is 
impossible to overestimate the importance and role of Russia’s natural oil and gas 
reserves and its influence on Russian foreign policy-making.   
Both regionally and domestically, Russia has managed energy as a tool for 
establishing Russia as a major power. The abundance of Russia’s oil and gas reserves 
and its indispensability as a major exporter of energy to the global market has allowed 
Russia to exploit the global energy market in Russia’s favor. Russia’s energy policy 
has been utilized as a tool of foreign policy in the following ways: interrupting or 
threatening to interrupt energy supplies, exploiting prices, the use of energy debts, 
government involvement or direct control of companies or infrastructure.110 Russia’s 
energy diplomacy has been extremely effective but this is due to the direct 
involvement of governmental connections and interest. Scholars have examined how 
politicized Russia’s role in the energy market really is, arguing, “foreign investors are 
met with obstacles, unpredictable changes of the regulatory framework and 	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politicized decisions aimed at promoting national interest on the expense of the 
market”.111 The exploitation of Russia’s energy resources as a foreign and domestic 
policy tool cannot be understated, because for Russia, energy is one of the most 
important tools that continue to allow Russia to aspire towards great power status.  
In the case of Syria, energy trade relations between the two countries have 
grown increasingly with the majority of the contracts in favor of Russian exports. 
Russia’s state-owned energy companies have utilized the absence of foreign 
companies in Syria’s energy sector, establishing extensive direct and indirect links 
between both governments. In late 2013, Russian state-controlled oil and gas 
company Soyuzneftegaz and the Syrian regime signed a 25 year agreement for the 
rights to drill and produce oil off Syria’s coast, covering 2,190 square kilometers of 
the Mediterranean Sea.112 This agreement solidifies the support and cooperation 
between the Syrian regime and the Russian government, allowing Russia to capitalize 
on its alliance with Assad and increase its presence in the Middle East. The 
agreement not only supports the regime in Syria but also provides a new source of 
revenue for future support of the isolated regime. Russia’s energy exporters are 
worried that regime change in Syria would mean the loss of contracts, as was the case 
with Libya after the removal of the Qaddafi regime. Russian energy companies also 
suffered from the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, with reports 
estimating that the Russian government and Hussein’s regime were mutually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Ibid.,	  pg.	  114.	  112	  Borzou	  Daragahi	  and	  Henry	  Foy,	  "Russia	  Tightens	  Links	  to	  Bashar	  Al-­‐Assad	  with	  Syria	  Energy	  Deal."	  Financial	  Times.	  26	  Dec.	  2013.	  
	  	   68	  
channeling funds and resources for each other’s benefit.113 For Putin, the results of the 
Arab Spring have had a negative impact on Russian economic relations, which 
threatens potential business deals between the Syrian regime and the Russian 
government. Putin has recognized the threat posed by regime change, stating “in the 
countries that have gone through…[Arab Spring,] Russian companies are losing the 
positions they built over decades on local markets”.114 
Compared to the other internal factors that influence Russian foreign policy 
towards Syria, Russia’s energy sector may play the least important role. Russian-
Syrian energy trade relations are insignificant compared to Russia’s trade relations 
with Europe or other Central Asian countries, but Russia has utilized its relationship 
with Assad in order to gain more leverage in Middle Eastern energy markets. In short, 
Russia’s energy relations with Syria play an important but by no means dominant role 
in Russia’s foreign policy-making towards Syria. Since 2011, Syria’s energy sector 
has faced challenges due to issues regarding the crisis and sanctions imposed from the 
international community, allowing Russia to utilize its support for the Syrian regime 
into bilateral energy relations with Syria. Russia’s energy sector is such a significant 
part of Russia’s total economy that it is impossible to discuss internal factors that 
influence Russian foreign policy without the influence of Russia’s energy resources.  
 
4.3   Internal Conflict/Rise of Radical Islam 
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 Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has dealt with several 
ethnically based domestic and international military conflicts. Russia has faced ethnic 
conflicts in the Caucasus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Tajikistan, and has faced 
the threat of terrorism both internationally and domestically, which has had a major 
impact on Russia’s foreign policy making. One of the most important conflicts, which 
helped shape Russian contemporary foreign policy, was the First and Second 
Chechen Wars. The First Chechen War began as an attempt to gain Chechen 
independence from Russia through various separatist groups, which were later 
supplanted by terrorist groups under the guise of radical Islam in an attempt to 
establish an Islamic Caucasus Emirate in the region. The radicalization of the 
Chechen separatist groups began after the First Chechen War, when nationalist 
leaders were replaced by Salafists, who urged for a global jihad against Russia, it’s 
citizens, and all other non-Muslims worldwide. In 1999, Russia invaded Chechnya as 
a response to the invasion of Dagestan from Chechen rebels of the Islamic 
International Brigade. While the campaign may have ended the de facto independence 
and restored Russian control over the region, the official reasoning behind the 
military operation was to counter terrorism in the region. Lo states that “the war was 
popular…not so much for purely territorial reasons, but because the general belief 
that intervention had been necessary in order to prevent the North Caucasus region… 
from becoming a constant source of terrorist threat, rampant crime and political and 
religious extremism that would directly undermine the security of Russia and its 
citizens”.115  
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Fighting the threat of terrorism in Chechnya provided Russia with justification 
for its military campaign against the Chechen territory, being portrayed as fight 
against both domestic and international terrorism. Major terrorist attacks against 
Russia, such as the 1999 Russian apartment bombings, the 2002 Moscow theater 
hostage crisis, and the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, helped solidify the fear of 
radical Islam from the Caucasus to Russian citizens and the international community. 
Then Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov declared Russia’s war with Chechnya as “the front 
line of international terrorism”, while emphasizing, “that Chechnya was a Russian 
internal affair”.116 The Russian government invaded the Chechen region committing 
human rights violations, such as the Human Rights Watch testimony that “conducted 
over 500 interviews with Chechen refugees in Ingushetia, finding evidence of 
widespread arbitrary arrests, beatings, and military targeting of civilians by Russian 
forces”.117 Scholars such as Bugaski argue, “Moscow manipulates the Islamic terrorist 
stereotype to convince the West that it is simply combating the common threat of 
jihadism in the North Caucasus and elsewhere on Russian controlled territory”.118 
For the Russian Federation, ethnic conflict has been and will continue to be a 
potential major source of domestic instability. The North Caucuses, Russia’s most 
volatile region, presents the biggest threat to Russia’s regional interests and stability 
outside of the growing threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. With regards to 
Syria, the internal conflict between Russia and Chechnya reveals two major domestic 	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influences to Russian foreign policy: the issue of sovereignty and the rise of radical 
Islam in the region. Both issues will be further analyzed to further demonstrate how 
Russia’s internal conflicts, specifically Chechnya, have influenced their policy in 
support for the al-Assad regime in Syria.  
 
Rise of Radical Islam  
 After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 2001, Putin saw 
an opportunity to reshape Russia’s threats, specifically in Chechnya, as a threat of 
global terrorism. What began as a separatist campaign for independence was 
transformed to a major terrorist threat that became a major source of crime and 
political and religious extremism in the region, which Putin utilized for popular 
support amongst Russian citizens. Russia’s position in the region and its conflict in 
the Caucuses allowed itself to utilize its role as an ally to the United States, in a ‘war 
on terror’, that the U.S. would be unable to handle on its own. Scholars argue that 
“the Islamic threat to the Central Asian regimes in the 1990s allowed Russia to aim to 
regain its former imperial influence in the region, and to claim justification for 
increasing the powers of the executive and the security services at the expense of 
human rights”.119  Putin was able to demonstrate a number of political triumphs 
regarding Chechnya, such as restoring Russian territorial integrity in Chechnya, the 
demonstration of Russia’s power and military forces, successfully preventing external 
pressure on an internal issue, and popular support from the Russian people, which 
helped strengthen Russia’s overall power status amongst international community.  	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The transformation of Chechen forces from a separatist campaign during the 
First Chechen War to a radical Islamist movement during the Second Chechen War 
was largely due to the influx of foreign jihadists. Kroupenev argues that the 
radicalization of the separatist movement in Chechnya “began as a direct outcome of 
Russia’s military reaction to Chechen separatist tendencies” and that the “Chechen 
appeal to Islam exacerbated the conflict and, by welcoming the infiltration of foreign 
radical elements, led to further destabilization of the North Caucasus”.120 Vidino adds 
that “as Islamism supplanted nationalism as the motivating factor of the Chechen 
cause, hundreds of Muslim youths from the Middle East and Europe flocked to 
Chechnya”.121 
Putin and other government officials have been extremely vocal about their 
fear of terrorism and the increased terrorist attacks experienced in Russia due to the 
spread of extremism in the region. According to the Global Terrorism Database, 
Russia experienced an increase from 50 terrorist incidents in 2007 to 170 incidents in 
2008 and an even higher 250 incidents in 2010.122 This increase in terrorist activities 
allowed Putin to apply ruthless measures as counter terrorism tactics in Chechnya, 
such as large-scale bombings, torture, and other human rights violations. The brutality 
of the Chechen terrorist attacks and the increased hostage takings have decreased 
international sympathy for the Chechen campaign; meanwhile, strengthening Putin’s 	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policy in the region while distracting the international community from the human 
rights violations committed by the Russian military. A major change to the incidents 
of terrorism in the Caucuses has been the reduction of incidents in Chechnya and the 
increase of incidents in other republics, mostly in Dagestan, which accounts for the 
262 out of 438 terrorist incidents that took place in 2012 alone.123  The spread of 
terrorist activities throughout the region motivated by groups from the Caucasus 
Emirate, which is the central source of Islamic terrorism in Russia, poses one of the 
biggest concerns to the security of the Russian Federation. According to a U.S. 
Congressional Research report regarding security concerns in Russia, the Caucasus 
Emirate not only “receives substantial material and ideological support from the 
global terrorist network”, but it also “provides ideological, financial, and weapons 
support…in the North Caucasus and Volga areas, Moscow, and elsewhere”.124 U.S. 
analyst Gordon Hahn has warned that the Caucasus Emirate has already expanded its 
operations with factions discovered in Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, France, 
and Azerbaijan.125 
Scholars have focused on the strategic and economic motives behind Russia’s 
support for the al-Assad regime, but the deepening sectarian warfare in Syria and it’s 
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spread in the region has been a less analyzed, major factor behind Russia’s foreign 
policy towards Syria. Russia has expressed its concern for the rise of radical Islamic 
groups in the region, especially due to the ongoing terrorist activities in the Caucasus 
and the current state of radical Islamic terrorism spreading throughout Syria and Iraq, 
not far from Russia’s borders and it’s neighbors. In the case of Syria, factions 
opposing the Al-Assad regime, such as the al-Nusra front, have merged with various 
groups in Iraq, formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, to form the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (IS or ISIS), which has now presented itself as a major terrorist concern in 
the region and to the international community. The development of ISIS has resulted 
in a US-led coalition of countries to combat the organization, which Russia has 
abstained from joining and has boycotted due to its lack of UNSC authorization. 
Magen has argued that Russia “is protesting against military intervention in Syria 
without a mandate from the UN Security Council, and without the Syrian regime 
requesting such intervention” because “of failure to include Russia on equal terms 
with the U.S. in making the coalition’s main decisions on regional matters”.126  For 
Russia, the accelerating radicalization of Islamic groups and Russia’s fear for its 
expansion in the region have bolstered Russia’s support for the Al-Assad regime, 
which Russia has defended since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War. Russia and 
the West both share concerns about the rise of violence in the region, but they differ 
greatly on the topic of solutions, where the former backs the regime in order to 
guarantee stability and the latter insists on Assad’s departure, potentially leaving 
Syria even more unstable. The international community may have redirected its 	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attention in Syria from the al-Assad regime to the current concerns over ISIS, but for 
Russia the al-Assad regime continues to be a regime in need of support during the 
U.S.-led military intervention against ISIS.  
One of the major issues surroundings the increase of radical factions amongst 
the Syrian opposition, is the concern of foreign fighters amongst the opposition. The 
current situation in Syria and Iraq has drawn more than 20,000 foreign fighters from 
all over the world in what the U.S. Chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee has called “the largest convergence of Islamist terrorists in world 
history”.127 It is estimated that in Syria and Iraq today, there are over 1,700 Russians 
jihadis fighting alongside ISIS, leaving the Russian government worried about the 
growing threat of instability in the region and domestically.128 For Russia, the reality 
of the terrorist threat that exists domestically is still a major concern. What was once 
a separatist organization has now turned into a desired independent Islamic republic 
that continues to fight against Russia, while pledging allegiance to the leaders of the 
Islamic State and defecting to the IS campaign. The Caucasus Emirate has been a 
vocal supporter of the Syrian opposition with an estimated 200 to 1000 Chechen 
fighters in Syria, leaving the Russian government concerned for the return of these 
trained terrorists domestically.129 The rise of radical factions in the region and in the 
Caucuses is a major concern to the Russian government domestically and for its 
support for the al-Assad regime in Syria.  
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For Russia, its policy in the Middle East provides the Russian government 
with the opportunity to cooperate with Muslims abroad in an attempt to win over the 
growing Muslim population inside of the Russian Federation. Russia’s policy in the 
Middle East has been to emphasize the civilizational diversity of the West vs. the rest, 
but this emphasis has only divided Russia even further from Muslims in Russia and 
the Middle East, partly due to its support for oppressive regimes and its failure to 
prevent the interventions in Iraq and Libya. Russia has a significant Muslim 
population that has witnessed the inclusion of Islam throughout the uprisings of the 
Arab Spring, worrying officials in Moscow over the potential for opposition 
movements throughout the country. For many of the separatist fighters in the North 
Caucuses, the Arab Spring movement solidified the dialogue of Islamic solidarity 
with the opposition movement against the Russian government. For Russia, a country 
with over 25 million Muslims, domestic and foreign policies have demonstrated a 
counterproductive approach that “could motivate Russia’s previously fractured 
Muslim leadership to unite and create a formidable social and political opposition”.130 
The crisis in Syria and the development of the Islamic State has resulted in a 
fear of regional instability and the spread of radical Islam throughout the region.  
Russian politicians have warned that the fall of the al-Assad regime would destabilize 
the region and result in the spread of transnational Islamic networks. For Russia, a 
country that has fought and continues to fight terrorism, this fear has become more of 
a reality that has established connections to terrorist networks in its own country. The 
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Russian government believes that the al-Assad regime is a preferable choice to the 
option of further instability in the region should the Syrian regime fall.   
 
Issue of Sovereignty 
One of the most important issues surrounding the First and Second Chechen 
Wars, in connection with Russian foreign policy towards the al-Assad regime during 
the Syrian Civil War, is the issue of state sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty is 
deeply rooted in politics and international affairs because it provides an agreement 
that is conducive to maintaining certain values and norms that are considered 
fundamentally important in global affairs.  Sovereignty recognizes the necessity of 
international legal equality, or the equal status among independent, self-governing 
states. The issue of state sovereignty is enshrined in Article 2(4) on the UN Charter, 
which argues for the prohibition of the use of force, more specifically stating that 
states must refrain from the “threat of use of force against the territorial integrity” of 
another member state.131  
Former UN Secretary General and former UN-Arab-League Joint Special 
Envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan recognized the changing nature of state sovereignty 
when he said, “sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power”.132 Sovereignty as 
responsibility implies that states are responsible for the affairs of protecting the safety 
and lives of its citizens, which holds the state responsible through the auspices of the 
United Nations. Francioni and Bakker assert that “it is generally accepted that all 
states have an international obligation to respect human dignity and to refrain from 	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committing gross violations of human rights such as genocide, torture, slavery, 
systemic racial discrimination or severe and widespread deprivations of the rights and 
freedoms of their citizens”.133  
 The UN has established that states may not use force against other members 
of the UN and that states have a responsibility to protect its citizens, but as in the case 
of Syria, the al-Assad regime has been accused of using chemical weapons against his 
people along with other human rights violations. In the case of Syria, many 
proponents have argued for military intervention in the Syrian Civil War in order to 
protect the civilian populations against mass atrocities, which have been based on the 
norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The international community has 
embraced the norm of R2P, but has been selective on it’s application. Previous 
interventions, such as Kosovo and Libya, which will be discussed below, have tainted 
many in the international communities view of intervention under a guise as 
humanitarian. Francioni and Bakker argue that “there is a general consensus today 
that the inaction of the Security Council, and especially the unwillingness of China 
and Russia to consent to the authorization of forcible intervention in the Syrian crisis 
is due, at least in part, to the destabilizing effects of the military campaign and the 
perceived ultra vires use of force in Libya, …not only to save the life of civilians and 
to facilitate a cease fire, but to effectively bring about regime change, as has 
ultimately happened”.134 	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The issue of intervention and sovereignty in Syria demands attention to the 
more recent ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Libya, which resulted in NATO air 
campaigns and assistance to the rebel effort to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In the 
case of Libya, both Russia and China abstained from voting for UN Resolution 1973, 
which authorized “all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian 
populated sears under threat of attack”.135 NATO air campaigns, assistance to the 
rebels, and the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime convinced Moscow that the claims of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ in Libya were utilized under the guise of the 
Responsibility to Protect as an elaborate disguise for regime change. Anderson attests 
that the intervening powers “took a distinctly limited license by the Security Council 
for humanitarian intervention in Libya and turned it into unlimited license for regime 
change”, which “has poisoned the well of political legitimacy for humanitarian 
intervention, through overreach beyond the terms of formal law”.136  
State sovereignty and the pattern of regime change under the disguise of 
humanitarian intervention are both major factors behind Russia’s support for the al-
Assad regime. Like Syria, Russia is a country that suffers from ethnic conflict due to 
racial and religious divisions. Unlike many of the republics in the region that evolved 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has failed to flourish into a nation-state with 
clear ethnic boundaries. Bugaski claims that “the prospect of territorial splintering 
could embolden the Kremlin to pursue more aggressive policies not only towards 
rebellious regions but also against several neighbors in order to divert attention from 	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Russia’s weaknesses”.137 Russia has been effective in promoting values and norms in 
the international system, but has reserved the right to intervene in many former Soviet 
states, displaying how Russia has applied unique standards to concepts of sovereignty 
and non-interference to itself. Russia has been guilty of such events, such as the 
Russo-Georgian War, the First and Second Chechen Wars, and its most recent 
annexation of the Crimea, all of which could be deemed intervention worthy on 
behalf of many in the international community. Charap argues that the “notion that 
Russia could eventually be the target of such intervention might seem absurd in 
Washington, but suspicion, bordering on paranoia, of future potential U.S. intention 
runs deep in Moscow”.138 This fear, along with Russia’s more aggressive policy in its 
region, has resulted in an increase of Russia’s use of power in the international 
system, such as the UNSC, to avoid constructing a precedent that could ultimately be 
used against it.  
For Russia, the situation in Syria is reminiscent of the wars fought with 
Chechnya and the continued terrorism experienced in the Caucasus region. In both 
conflicts the state fought against various opposition forces, which would later 
incorporate extremist Sunni Islam into their strategy. Putin has stressed that Syria has 
become the frontline in a global fight against radical Islamism experienced in 
Afghanistan, Chechnya, and now, a number of Arab states. Since the beginning of the 
protests in Syria, Russia has warned that the removal of the Syrian regime would 
result in religious sectarian war. For Russia, domestic and regional stability are a 	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necessary prerequisite for successfully completing its foreign policy objectives and 
increasing its status in the international system.  
 
4.4   Role of the Media 
Over the last fifteen years of Vladimir Putin’s time as prime minister and 
president, Russia has experienced an increase in state dominance of media outlets 
throughout the country, reaching levels of centralization and uniformity not 
experienced since the Soviet Union. Mostly all major national television networks are 
now controlled by the Kremlin, as well as large newspapers, online news, and radio 
stations. In 2006, Putin shut down or nationalized nearly all of the independent radio 
and television stations, forcing stations to stop broadcasting programs unapproved by 
the Kremlin. Journalists critical of the government have increasingly been silenced 
through harsh tactics, such as imprisonment and even death. In Russia, a country with 
weak democratic institutions, the media plays an extremely important role in the 
information, political outcome, and political environment in the country. According 
to reports, 70% of Russia’s population relies on state-controlled television for their 
news, which has left the majority of Russians without narratives that compete with 
the state’s political agenda.139 This has resulted in a population unable to decipher the 
truth from the government’s agenda, ultimately rallying support behind Putin and his 
domestic and foreign policies.  
While the government has not shut down every voice of dissent in the country, 
it has utilized its control to help shape public opinion by restructuring international 	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communications and structures of propaganda. State restrictions have limited the 
freedom of media through the way information is being restricted into Russia and to 
its citizens, but also by framing a particular political environment to earn public 
support for government polices. Russia Today (RT), one of Russia’s largest state-
owned television companies, was founded in 2005 as a channel to feed Russia’s 
government propaganda and foreign policy to outside audiences around the world. 
“Perhaps no organization better traces the transformation of Kremlin thinking from 
soft power to weaponization than the Kremlin’s international rolling news channel, 
RT,” which has turned its attention from promoting Russia to making the West, 
especially the US, look bad.140 The Kremlin has stressed the importance of utilizing 
soft power tools through media persuasion as a key instrument in its domestic and 
foreign policies. Putin’s idea of soft power differs slightly from the traditional, Joseph 
Nye version of soft power. In the Russian media, soft power has been used less as a 
vision for attraction and more as a vision for manipulation. Putin has stressed the 
importance of a ‘strong Russia’ based on a belief that Russia is a unique civilization 
vying for international power. Control of the media has allowed Putin to tailor 
communications domestically and internationally from Russia, in an attempt to 
provide a more ‘Russian’ perspective on international events apart from the Western 
perspective.  
Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the Russian media has utilized the 
crisis as a tool in Russian domestic politics. During the beginning of the conflict, 
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Russia was experiencing an outbreak of protests in response to Putin’s presidential 
elections in early 2012. As a response to the protests, the Kremlin responded by 
blaming the United States for its plot against Putin’s third presidential term, which 
was also utilized in the case of American intentions with the al-Assad regime in 
Syria. For Russia, the Arab Spring presented a new threat of international intervention 
in internal conflicts that were a result of popular protests against an authoritarian 
ruler. This new threat is something that Russia worries could lead to further 
demonstrations and/or potential intervention/regime change; therefore, the majority of 
state-owned Russian media has focused on the perspective of the al-Assad regime, 
while presenting the situation in Syria as a fight against American aggression and 
hegemony in the region. By simplifying the civil war, the media placed the context of 
the Syrian crisis into the same categories as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as another 
Western efforts at regime change.  
The Russian media portrayal of the Arab Spring, or what they called the Arab 
revolution, was portrayed not as developments of democratization but processes of 
destabilization. The uprisings throughout the region were attributed to the influence 
of external factors, such as Western interests, intervention for potential regime 
change, and the potential to reduce Russian influence in the region. The protests were 
compared to the color revolutions experienced against Russia by the former Soviet 
countries, which were also portrayed as a plot by Western powers for their own 
interest.  
The media depiction of the Syrian crisis differed greatly in Russia compared 
to external news sources. Bagdonas claims that “what was seen in the West as a 
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growing armed reaction to crimes against humanity perpetrated by a brutal regime, in 
Russia appeared as a concerted effort by Western states and their Arab clients to 
sabotage any chances for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to overturn the 
government that still enjoyed the support of the majority of Syrians”.141 Since the 
beginning of the conflict, Syrian opposition to the al-Assad regime were portrayed as 
radical fundamentalist groups, presenting the conflict as the regime’s struggle with 
terrorism, which resonated in Russia due to its experience with terrorism in the 
Caucuses. Russian government officials and the media stressed the potential for 
extremism as a result of the revolutions, which was presented as a potential threat to 
the Russian state. In a study focusing on Russian popular opinion in Syria, Philipp 
Casula highlights how the Russian media negatively portrayed the numerous Syrian 
opposition forces, which “barely mention the peaceful opposition against Assad and 
completely ignore its violent repression and the human rights violations by the 
regime”.142  
Russian media sources went beyond misrepresenting opposition groups and 
the regime alike by distorting the events occurring in Syria, sometimes spreading 
disinformation in an attempt to justify Russian support for the al-Assad regime 
against the opposition forces. During the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Russia 
Today reported of an alleged massacre by rebel forces, which was later found to have 
no evidence supporting the claims.143 When most of the international community and 	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even a UN investigative team placed suspicion on the Syrian regime for the chemical 
weapons attack in August 2014, Russia Today and other government controlled 
media sources reported of proof that the Syrian rebels were to blame for the use of 
sarin gas against civilians. Russia Today published an article using a MIT report to 
challenge U.S. accusations that the Syrian regime was responsible for the chemical 
attack.144 It is obvious through the use of incorrect findings and claims that support 
the Kremlins objectives that the Russian state-controlled media is aiming at confusing 
public opinion, spreading disinformation, and discrediting Western messages.  
 
This chapter (Ch.4) has examined and demonstrated the main domestic factors 
that have influenced Russia’s foreign policy-making towards the al-Assad regime in 
Syria. For Russia, a strong centralized government is key to state control over every 
resource available towards Russia’s goal of great power status. Overall, the autocratic 
approach that Putin has utilized in his regime to enforce state control over the energy 
sector and the media are part of an effort to strengthen and stabilize the current 
political system and the elite that control that system. By strengthening and 
preserving Moscow’s power domestically, Putin is able to mold foreign policy as he 
sees fit with economic and public support. For Russia, a country that has dealt with 
intense internal conflict, the issue of potential instability, an increase in terrorism, and 
the spread of radical Islam both domestically and regionally present a major threat to 
the stability and success of the current Russian government. To finalize this chapter, I 
would like to reiterate how influential these factors have been for Russia’s support of 	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the Syrian regime. For the Russian government, these domestic influences are utilized 
for both domestic and foreign policies attempting to strengthen Russia’s power 
domestically and internationally. These factors have helped Putin justify and further 
strengthen the relationship between the Russian government and the Syrian regime. 
This chapter has demonstrated how each of these factors has influenced Russia 
foreign policy in support for the al-Assad regime.  
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Ch. 5- Conclusion  
 
This thesis was aimed at examining Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime 
during the Syrian Civil War through the lens of constructivist theory, which questions 
the ‘national’ understanding of a state’s interest, focusing on identity and local factors 
that influence foreign policy. By using constructivist theory, this thesis was able to 
demonstrate how an identity of great power status has influenced Russia’s self-
perception of that as a great power both domestically and internationally. This thesis’ 
main research question was aimed at answering the following question: why does 
Russia support the al-Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War? While attempting to 
answer this question, this thesis also sought to examine what domestic factors are 
linked to Russian foreign policy implementation towards Syria and how Russia’s 
foreign policy decision towards Syria is affecting its relationship with the West and 
countries in the Middle East. By examining great power rivalry theory, which focuses 
on how the distribution of power in the international system influences the number of 
great powers and their polarity, this thesis demonstrated how the idea of Russian great 
power status has resonated into the idea that Russia must think and act like a great 
power with the privilege of involvement in matters deemed important to national 
interest. For Russia, its foreign policy is a tool utilized in the pursuit of increasing its 
great power status, which is an intrinsic part of the Russian national identity, or 
image, already engrained from a historical legacy that has left Russia seeking 
international power and status.  
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In order to properly analyze Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria, this thesis 
employed two levels of analysis: state and systemic. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
Russian support for the al-Assad at the systemic level is based on Russia’s overall 
foreign policy goals focused on strengthening Russia’s position and influence in the 
international system. At the state level, Russian support for the al-Assad regime can 
be traced to select domestic factors aimed at strengthening the Russian state and 
removing any challenges that would prevent Russia’s rise as a great power. At the 
state level, domestic factors such as regime type, energy policies, internal 
conflicts/the rise of radical Islam, and the role of the Russian media have had the 
greatest influence on Russia’s foreign policy in support of the al-Assad regime. These 
domestic factors help shape Russia’s self-perception of itself, how it interacts with the 
international system, and how it shapes its foreign policy. Analyzing Russia’s support 
for the al-Assad regime at the state and systemic levels provides a more 
comprehensive explanation for Russia’s behavior in support of the unpopular, 
internationally isolated Syrian regime.  
Excluding this chapter, this thesis consisted of four chapters aimed at 
analyzing Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime. Chapters 1 and 2 contain 
background information to the current crisis in Syria and a review of relevant 
literature, while establishing the theoretical framework utilized in this research. The 
review displays that some scholarly literature regarding Russia’s support for Assad 
are based on micro level explanations focused on interests that are unable to provide a 
complete explanation for Russian foreign policy-making. Extensive research into this 
complex issue of Russian foreign policy towards Syria displays an absence of 
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comprehensive scholarly literature. That being said, this research has intended to 
display the complex reasoning behind Russia’s foreign policy towards Syria through 
a constructivist theory approach.  
The following findings support this thesis’ hypothesis while answering the 
questions and sub questions presented. Chapter 3 addresses how Russia’s foreign 
policy has been influenced by factors of identity that contribute to Russia’s self-
perceived great power status. As displayed by Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, 
Russian foreign policy is driven by goals meant to strengthen and secure Russia’s 
international status, which will enable Russia to (1) pursue and secure its future 
interests and (2) preserve the growth and relatively peaceful security environment its 
has recently experienced. By examining Russia’s foreign policy and linking how 
identity has influenced that policy, Chapter 3 then examines Russia’s relationships 
with various countries that oppose or support the al-Assad regime, displaying how 
Russian behavior is linked to its self-perceived great power status. Russia has utilized 
its support for the Syrian regime in an attempt at strengthening its self-perceived great 
power status through its foreign policy. Chapter 4 presented the most significant 
domestic factors that have influenced Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime. For 
Russia, these factors present challenges and opportunities to Russia’s foreign policy 
goals and its perceived great power status. The energy rich nation has been plagued 
with serious social, economic, and political challenges, such as weak political 
institutions and a resource dependent economy, which this thesis has displayed plays 
a significant role in Russia’s foreign policy towards the al-Assad regime during the 
Syrian Civil War.  This thesis has demonstrated Russia’s desire for great power 
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status, focusing on how Russia has utilized this its relationship with the Syrian regime 
to strengthen and project Russian global, regional, and domestic power and influence.  
American hegemony and its power and influence have been waning, heralding 
a new era of rising multipolarity. Russia’s self-perception as that of a great power has 
resulted in a strong domestic and foreign policy aimed at positioning Russia as a pole 
of power that counters Western influence and interests. Russia’s support for the al-
Assad regime in Syria has brought new economic and political cooperation and 
opportunities with many countries in the Middle East. Russian behavior in the Middle 
East has been that of a strong, powerful nation able to provide alternatives to Western 
interests while satisfying Russia’s interests. Russian foreign policy-making can be 
viewed as an evolving attempt to define and advance its country’s power and 
influence with the overall goal of great power status recognition. Russian support for 
the al-Assad regime has provided a boost to its international status by providing 
support for policies that counter Western interests, such as nonintervention and state 
sovereignty. In the case of Syria, sovereignty has been one of the main arguments 
used to defend Russian support for the al-Assad regime, with the goal of establishing 
a more multipolar world free from intrusion of Western interests. For Russia, the 
“vision of the future is one where a greater number of voices can be heard, western 
and non-western, northern and southern, particularly when it comes to establishing 
the parameters for each state’s economic and social development”.145 For the Russian 
government, any attempt at intervening in the Syrian Civil War outside of the 
approval of the UN Security Council, would be in direct violation of Syria’s 
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sovereignty; therefore, Russia has and continues to defend the Syrian regime despite 
internal pressure for al-Assad’s removal in a greater attempt to defend state 
sovereignty and prevent regime change on behalf of Western interests. 
This thesis has displayed that Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime is 
based on an identity of great power status, which Russia has utilized domestically, 
regionally, and internationally in order to strengthen its status. For Russia, the current 
conflict in Syria has less to do with the status of refugees or the human rights 
violations committed by the Syrian regime and is more focused on Russia’s gains and 
interests overall. Russia’s support for the unpopular regime has impacted its status 
among many nations that have called for the removal of the al-Assad regime. Given 
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy and its historical tradition as a strong state led 
by authoritarian figures, Russia’s behavior towards the al-Assad regime is 
comprehensible. Yet Russia’s great power objective and its support for the Syrian 
regime have resulted in a hardline response to the Syrian conflict and Russia’s 
involvement. Ultimately, Russia support for the al-Assad regime should not be 
viewed as a policy attempting to save and strengthen the Syrian regime, but instead is 
focused on securing and strengthening the Russian regime and its attempt at great 
power status.  
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